Robert Tait in Istanbul
The Guardian,
Monday June 23, 2008
Does the movement inspired by Fethullah Gülen represent a modern brand of Islam, or a subtle attempt to infiltrate religion into secular Turkey? The Guardian's religious affairs correspondent, Riazat Butt, reports from Istanbul
Video
A hitherto largely unknown Turkish Islamic scholar, Fethullah Gülen, has been voted the world's top intellectual in a poll to find the leading 100 thinkers.
Gülen, the author of more than 60 books, won a landslide triumph after the survey - which is organised by the British magazine, Prospect, and Foreign Policy, a US publication - attracted more than 500,000 votes.
The top 10 individuals were all Muslim and included two Nobel laureates, the novelist Orhan Pamuk, who is also Turkish, at No 4, and the Iranian human rights lawyer Shirin Ebadi, in 10th.
The result surprised organisers, who attributed it to a sustained campaign by Gülen's followers, known as the Gülen Movement, after Turkey's biggest-selling newspaper, Zaman, publicised the poll.
Prospect's editor, David Goohart, admitted to not having previously heard of Gülen and said his supporters had "made a mockery" of the poll. But he said the result flagged up significant political trends in Turkey.
"The victory of Gülen draws attention to the most important conflict in Europe, played out in Turkey between the secular nationalist establishment and the reforming Islamic democrats of the AK [Justice and Development] party," he said.
The AKP, which is allied to Gülen, is contesting a case brought by Turkey's chief prosecutor to shut it down and ban it from politics for allegedly trying to usher in Islamic rule, in breach of the country's secular constitution.
A Gülen supporter, Bulent Kenes, who is editor-in-chief of Today's Zaman newspaper, denied the poll had been hijacked. "There are many people who promote Gülen's ideas, which contribute to world peace by urging international dialogue and tolerance."
Gülen, 67, is known for a modernist brand of Islam. He was cleared of trying to topple the state in 2006 after being charged over footage in which he apparently urged civil service supporters to await his orders to overthrow the system. He said the film had been doctored.
Gülen, who has lived in the US since 1998, is credited with establishing a global network of schools which preach Islam in a spirit of tolerance. He has been praised in the west for promoting dialogue and condemned Osama bin Laden as a monster after September 11.
Source
Showing posts with label Politics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Politics. Show all posts
Tuesday, June 24, 2008
Tuesday, June 17, 2008
Rand: AK Party closure will deepen divide
Monday, 16 June 2008
The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is likely to take a moderate course if it is not closed down by the Constitutional Court and act more cautiously about pressing for measures that could be perceived as changing the secular-religious balance in the country or provoking the secularists into another attempt to remove it from power, a study sponsored by the Pentagon has predicted.
The report, sponsored by the undersecretary of defense for policy and conducted by the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, also found that the religious-secularist divide will deepen within Turkey and that Turkey's relations with the European Union will become more problematic if the ruling party is closed. Shutting down the AK Party, however, is unlikely to eliminate it as a political force because "if it is closed, the party is likely to simply reemerge under another name," the report said.
"It would, however, sharpen the secularist-religious divide within Turkey and could lead some pious Turks to lose faith in the political system. Turkey's prospects of EU membership, already facing serious obstacles, would be further jeopardized," the report, penned by Angel Rabasa and F. Stephen Larrabee, predicted.
The AK Party is facing closure on charges of becoming a focal point of anti-secular activities. Its senior members, including Prime Minister Erdoğan, and President Abdullah Gül, a former AK Party member, are also facing political bans.
Assessing the alternative scenarios for Turkish politics, the RAND report said the AK Party will be faced with structural limits for opening space for Islam in the public sphere. One such limitation stems from the fact that “the Kemalist establishment remains largely intact” and that “any government that crosses the lines that define the acceptable role of religion in politics risks accentuating political tensions and possibly provoking intervention by the military.” Other factors, such as Turkey’s Western orientation and the presence of a moderate and pluralistic tradition of Islam that does not embrace rigid interpretations or Shariah rule will also lead the AK Party to take a moderate path.
According to the report, there are other scenarios under which the AK Party could pursue a more aggressive Islamist agenda or the military could intervene in the country’s politics, but they look less likely. It noted that there were secularist Turks who were worried that the AK Party would appoint Islamists to state posts and turn away from Europe to create a rival Islamic bloc. But this “creeping Islamization” scenario is unlikely for several reasons: “First, it would lead to greater political polarization and would likely provoke intervention by the military. Second, most Turks support a secular state and oppose a state based on the Shariah. Third, EU membership has been a core element of the AK Party’s foreign policy,” said the report.
As for possible direct military intervention, the report said this would occur only as a last resort in the event that the AK Party presses for an Islamic agenda more aggressively. “A confrontation could take place if the AK Party takes actions seen by the military as crossing important lines. …While direct intervention by the military cannot be excluded from consideration, especially if the AK Party begins to push an Islamic agenda more aggressively, it is not very likely and would occur only as a last resort after the military had exhausted all other options,” said the report.
The report noted that the AK Party’s Erdoğan, unlike his Islamist predecessor, Necmettin Erbakan, was oriented toward Europe and that the party’s electoral success “does not translate into popular support for an Islamist agenda.” Assessing the implications of the AK Party’s pro-European policies, the report said they paved the way for the reconfiguration of Turkish politics as well: “As the West became a tacit ally of the AK Party, formerly pro-Western secularists surfaced as opponents of EU accession. The [main opposition Republican People’s Party] CHP, once the champion of a Western orientation for Turkey, has increasingly moved in a more nationalistic direction and has adopted a more ambiguous attitude toward the West, seeing some aspects of the West’s influence as a threat to the integrity of the Turkish state and Kemalism.”
Lessons for US: Turkish alliance in Mideast not taken for granted
With its renewed focus on Middle Eastern affairs and growing interests in the region, Turkey is likely to avoid offering the United States a blank check for military cooperation, a US study has revealed.
The study, sponsored by the Pentagon and conducted by the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, said the Turkish policy toward the Middle East is likely to remain a sensitive issue in bilateral US-Turkish relations. “Turkey’s growing interests in the Middle East are likely to make Ankara wary about allowing the United States to use its military facilities for regional contingencies except where such operations are clearly perceived to be in Turkey’s interest,” it said, calling for a diversification of US access options that would provide alternatives to İncirlik air base in case Turkey increases restrictions on US use of it or other Turkish facilities.
Turkey disappointed the US by refusing to cooperate militarily in the war on Iraq in 2003. Iran, whose nuclear program is viewed with deep suspicion by the US, is expected to be the next issue of contention between Ankara and Washington in the event the US administration decides to go ahead with military sanctions to force Tehran to end its nuclear program.
The RAND report also cautioned the US administration against describing Turkey as a “model” for coexistence of Islam and democracy in its political system because this makes many Turks, particularly the secularists and the military who believe that it pushes Turkey politically closer to the Middle East and weakens Turkey’s Western identity, “uncomfortable.”
This, however, does not mean that Turkey is different from other Muslim countries in its long experience with fusing Islam with Westernization. Referring to Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), the report said: “The ability of a party with Islamic roots to operate within the framework of a secular democratic system while respecting the boundaries between religion and state would refute the argument that Islam cannot be reconciled with modern secular democracy. On the other hand, if the experiment fails, it could lead to greater secular-Islamic polarization, further reducing the middle ground needed to build the moderate Muslim bulwark needed to contain the spread of radicalized Islam.”
“Beyond Turkey, the accommodation of Islam with democracy and secularism that has been achieved there is a valuable resource in the current ideological conflict between radical and mainstream interpretations of Islam. Mainstream entities in Turkey, therefore, should be encouraged to partner with groups and institutions elsewhere in the Muslim world to propagate moderate and pluralistic interpretations of Islam,” the report also noted.
The report dismissed characterization of the current tensions in Turkey as a struggle between “Islamists” and “secularists” and said these tensions were “a part of a struggle for power between newly emerging social sectors and the secularized elite -- a struggle between the ‘periphery’ and the ‘center’-- that has deep roots in Ottoman and recent Turkish history.”
It also noted that while the AK Party has Islamic roots, “it enjoys broad-based political support that transcends religious, class, and regional differences” and suggested Washington should remain committed to supporting Turkey’s membership in the EU because this would “rebut the claim that the West, especially Europe, is innately hostile to Muslims.”
Future US administrations will need to work closely with congressional leaders to ensure that the Armenian issue does not poison future relations with Turkey, the report said, and urged Washington to follow up with concrete steps in its current cooperation with Turkey against the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
İstanbul Today’s Zaman
Source
RAND - The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey
RAND - TURKEY AS A U.S. SECURITY PARTNER
The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is likely to take a moderate course if it is not closed down by the Constitutional Court and act more cautiously about pressing for measures that could be perceived as changing the secular-religious balance in the country or provoking the secularists into another attempt to remove it from power, a study sponsored by the Pentagon has predicted.
The report, sponsored by the undersecretary of defense for policy and conducted by the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, also found that the religious-secularist divide will deepen within Turkey and that Turkey's relations with the European Union will become more problematic if the ruling party is closed. Shutting down the AK Party, however, is unlikely to eliminate it as a political force because "if it is closed, the party is likely to simply reemerge under another name," the report said.
"It would, however, sharpen the secularist-religious divide within Turkey and could lead some pious Turks to lose faith in the political system. Turkey's prospects of EU membership, already facing serious obstacles, would be further jeopardized," the report, penned by Angel Rabasa and F. Stephen Larrabee, predicted.
The AK Party is facing closure on charges of becoming a focal point of anti-secular activities. Its senior members, including Prime Minister Erdoğan, and President Abdullah Gül, a former AK Party member, are also facing political bans.
Assessing the alternative scenarios for Turkish politics, the RAND report said the AK Party will be faced with structural limits for opening space for Islam in the public sphere. One such limitation stems from the fact that “the Kemalist establishment remains largely intact” and that “any government that crosses the lines that define the acceptable role of religion in politics risks accentuating political tensions and possibly provoking intervention by the military.” Other factors, such as Turkey’s Western orientation and the presence of a moderate and pluralistic tradition of Islam that does not embrace rigid interpretations or Shariah rule will also lead the AK Party to take a moderate path.
According to the report, there are other scenarios under which the AK Party could pursue a more aggressive Islamist agenda or the military could intervene in the country’s politics, but they look less likely. It noted that there were secularist Turks who were worried that the AK Party would appoint Islamists to state posts and turn away from Europe to create a rival Islamic bloc. But this “creeping Islamization” scenario is unlikely for several reasons: “First, it would lead to greater political polarization and would likely provoke intervention by the military. Second, most Turks support a secular state and oppose a state based on the Shariah. Third, EU membership has been a core element of the AK Party’s foreign policy,” said the report.
As for possible direct military intervention, the report said this would occur only as a last resort in the event that the AK Party presses for an Islamic agenda more aggressively. “A confrontation could take place if the AK Party takes actions seen by the military as crossing important lines. …While direct intervention by the military cannot be excluded from consideration, especially if the AK Party begins to push an Islamic agenda more aggressively, it is not very likely and would occur only as a last resort after the military had exhausted all other options,” said the report.
The report noted that the AK Party’s Erdoğan, unlike his Islamist predecessor, Necmettin Erbakan, was oriented toward Europe and that the party’s electoral success “does not translate into popular support for an Islamist agenda.” Assessing the implications of the AK Party’s pro-European policies, the report said they paved the way for the reconfiguration of Turkish politics as well: “As the West became a tacit ally of the AK Party, formerly pro-Western secularists surfaced as opponents of EU accession. The [main opposition Republican People’s Party] CHP, once the champion of a Western orientation for Turkey, has increasingly moved in a more nationalistic direction and has adopted a more ambiguous attitude toward the West, seeing some aspects of the West’s influence as a threat to the integrity of the Turkish state and Kemalism.”
Lessons for US: Turkish alliance in Mideast not taken for granted
With its renewed focus on Middle Eastern affairs and growing interests in the region, Turkey is likely to avoid offering the United States a blank check for military cooperation, a US study has revealed.
The study, sponsored by the Pentagon and conducted by the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, said the Turkish policy toward the Middle East is likely to remain a sensitive issue in bilateral US-Turkish relations. “Turkey’s growing interests in the Middle East are likely to make Ankara wary about allowing the United States to use its military facilities for regional contingencies except where such operations are clearly perceived to be in Turkey’s interest,” it said, calling for a diversification of US access options that would provide alternatives to İncirlik air base in case Turkey increases restrictions on US use of it or other Turkish facilities.
Turkey disappointed the US by refusing to cooperate militarily in the war on Iraq in 2003. Iran, whose nuclear program is viewed with deep suspicion by the US, is expected to be the next issue of contention between Ankara and Washington in the event the US administration decides to go ahead with military sanctions to force Tehran to end its nuclear program.
The RAND report also cautioned the US administration against describing Turkey as a “model” for coexistence of Islam and democracy in its political system because this makes many Turks, particularly the secularists and the military who believe that it pushes Turkey politically closer to the Middle East and weakens Turkey’s Western identity, “uncomfortable.”
This, however, does not mean that Turkey is different from other Muslim countries in its long experience with fusing Islam with Westernization. Referring to Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), the report said: “The ability of a party with Islamic roots to operate within the framework of a secular democratic system while respecting the boundaries between religion and state would refute the argument that Islam cannot be reconciled with modern secular democracy. On the other hand, if the experiment fails, it could lead to greater secular-Islamic polarization, further reducing the middle ground needed to build the moderate Muslim bulwark needed to contain the spread of radicalized Islam.”
“Beyond Turkey, the accommodation of Islam with democracy and secularism that has been achieved there is a valuable resource in the current ideological conflict between radical and mainstream interpretations of Islam. Mainstream entities in Turkey, therefore, should be encouraged to partner with groups and institutions elsewhere in the Muslim world to propagate moderate and pluralistic interpretations of Islam,” the report also noted.
The report dismissed characterization of the current tensions in Turkey as a struggle between “Islamists” and “secularists” and said these tensions were “a part of a struggle for power between newly emerging social sectors and the secularized elite -- a struggle between the ‘periphery’ and the ‘center’-- that has deep roots in Ottoman and recent Turkish history.”
It also noted that while the AK Party has Islamic roots, “it enjoys broad-based political support that transcends religious, class, and regional differences” and suggested Washington should remain committed to supporting Turkey’s membership in the EU because this would “rebut the claim that the West, especially Europe, is innately hostile to Muslims.”
Future US administrations will need to work closely with congressional leaders to ensure that the Armenian issue does not poison future relations with Turkey, the report said, and urged Washington to follow up with concrete steps in its current cooperation with Turkey against the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
İstanbul Today’s Zaman
Source
RAND - The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey
RAND - TURKEY AS A U.S. SECURITY PARTNER
Nine Geopolitical Myths
Thursday, 12 June 2008
Geopolitics has traditionally been the study of the relationship and links between political power and geographic space. The doctrine of Geopolitics gained attention largely through the work of Sir Halford Mackinder in England and his formulation of the Heartland Theory in 1904, which in reference to the British Empire at the time explored the significance of sea power in world conflict.
Whilst politics looks at the application of power, geopolitics looks at power in relation to places and resources. The Western world has dominated the geopolitical scene since the beginning of the 20th century. This has led to the creation of a number of myths, whilst a number of narratives also hide the underlying problems with the Western world. As aware Muslims we should be acquainted with the global situation for not only is this necessary for the defence of the ummah and Islam, it also exposes the weakness of the Capitalist West.
What follows is a list of such myths:-
The world is over populated
The rate of population growth over the last century has been labelled the underlying cause of the world standing on the brink of disaster; it is argued we are running out of food to sustain such growing population. It is argued by the proponents of over-population that the huge growth in world population is responsible for poverty, environmental destruction and social unrest. Economic development in the third world is impossible as long as populations continue to grow as a result international agencies and governments have developed numerous programmes to curtail the rate of population growth, all of these have been implemented in the third world.
This alleged over-population has to be in relation to something to qualify it being over. That something is the use of resources. The resources being consumed leading to global imbalances are attributed to population sizes.
When all assumptions on the effects of population growth are scrutinised population increases in no way has ever contributed to the many ills of the world today and what becomes clear is that there is a clear political agenda in attributing the increasing global population as the cause of the worlds potential disaster. This agenda is to shift the real cause away from the lifestyles, living patterns, un-sustainability of consumerism, poverty and blatant abuse of the Third world in order that the western world can live of the third world.
The developed world also faces a very series conundrum; Japan, Russia, Germany, Switzerland and much of Eastern Europe are experiencing population decline, due to a huge reduction in births. The rest of the Western world would also have declining populations was it not for immigration. As population numbers decline in the West relative to the third world and Muslim world such countries will have a legitimate right based upon their numbers to demand greater say in so called international institutes and representation on international bodies. The issue of overpopulation is a very useful tool to vilify nations with rising populations and at the same time protecting its potential loss of future influence. This can be seen clearly with Turkish EU accession, upon joining the EU, Turkey's almost 70 million inhabitants would bestow it the second largest number of MEPs in the European Parliament. In addition Demographic projections indicate Turkey would surpass Germany in the number of seats by 2020. Turkey's membership would have wide ranging consequences for the future direction of the EU including the thorny issue of future enlargement plans, grounds by which Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of France has opposed Turkey's admission.[1] d' Estaing has suggested that it would lead to demands for accession by Morocco.
The world in not overpopulated, the West just consumes too much
Western intervention in the Balkans in the 1990's was in order to help Muslims
The NATO attack on Yugoslavia in 1993, was presented by the West as the consequence of Yugoslavia's stubborn refusal to settle for any reasonable peace plan - in particular its rejection of plans for an international security force to implement a peace plan in Kosovo. Intervention by the West and then the eventual bombing campaign by NATO is continually held as evidence that the current ‘war on terror' is not a war on Islam and how the West will intervene across the world for ‘humanitarian' purposes even helping Muslims as they apparently did in 1993. In reality the geopolitical aims were very different. The political instability in the Balkans during the 1990's was exacerbated by American determination to reduce Russia's influence in the region, increase Europe's dependency upon her and confer new legitimacy to NATO when it appeared increasingly redundant after the Cold War.
The Western powers and specifically both the US and Britain worked for the fragmentation of Yugoslavia as was revealed by the then US Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmerman in January 1992 before the outbreak of hostilities ‘we are aiming for a dissolution of Yugoslavia into independent states.'[2] On the 18th March 1992 the EU brokered a deal in Lisbon among Bosnian Muslims, Croatian and Serb communities partitioning the Serb republic into three ethnically based cantons which would act as a confederation functioning as an independent state. This agreement was sabotaged by the US which urged the Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic to renege the deal by declaring statehood saying ‘this was justified by the referendum on March 1st .' Jose Cutileiro, sectary general of the Western European union confirmed ‘to be fair President Alija Izethbegovics and his aids were encouraged to scupper the deal and to fight for a unitary Bosnian state by Western mediators.' This is what caused the Bosnian civil war.
Today 11 000 troops are stationed in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia for peace, however such troops have ensured US economic interests are secured. Former US congressman Lee Hamilton commented in the New York Times ‘we have completely taken over the control of the Balkans. US officials exercise managing functions all states of the former Yugoslavia. We are virtually the pro consul.' Karen Talbot geopolitical expert confirmed "the determination by the U.S and NATO, at all costs, to occupy Kosovo and virtually all of Yugoslavia, is spurred on by the enticement of abundant natural resources. Kosovo alone has the richest mineral resources in all of Europe west of Russia. The New York Times observed that "the sprawling state-owned Trepca mining complex, the most valuable piece of real estate in the Balkans, is worth at least $5 billion." producing gold, silver, pure lead, zinc, cadmium, as well as tens of millions of dollars in profits annually. "Kosovo also possesses 17 billion tons of coal reserves and Kosovo (like Serbia and Albania) also has oil reserves."[3] President Bill Clinton at the time let slip ‘If we are going to have a strong economic relationship that includes our ability to sell around the world, Europe has got to be a key...That‘s what the Kosovo thing was all about.'[4]
Since the bombing has ended, numerous US bases in the Balkans have been set up. A military base is being built in Kosovo, described as the largest US foreign base built since the Vietnam War. US domination of NATO meant intervention by NATO forces in the Balkans would ensure US influence in the region. A leaked version of the Pentagon's 1994-1999 Defense Planning Guidance report advises that the United States ‘must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO ... Therefore, it is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO as the primary instrument of Western defense and security, as well as the channel for US influence and participation in European security affairs.'
This all confirms the influence of Russia, the oil in the Caspian sea and the revitalisation of NATO (to continue US influence) where the geopolitical aims behind US and Western intervention, the lives of thousands of innocent people, the lives of the slaughtered in Srebrenica were a price worth paying for continued US dominance.
The world is running out of Oil
The struggle for global supremacy between Germany and Britain at the beginning of the 20th century drove them to search for alternative fuels to power the bulky coal based war machines. The discovery of oil fields in the Middle East in the 1920's spurred a century of new technologies, created new patterns of society and consumption and changed the global balance of power.
However like oil fossil fuels they are limited and will eventually finish. For the most part of the 20th century this was never a discussion as most of the worlds oil will still not discovered, technologies such as the fighter jet, tanks, automobiles were all designed to run on oil, apart from oil prices exploding if oil was drying up, such technologies would also become redundant.
Peak oil was fist introduced in the 1970's, this is the point where half of the known oil has been consumed, and at the time this view wad ridiculed and labelled a fringe view. Today it is considered a mainstream view and the world is running out of oil is considered a geopolitical headache for the world. No doubt the world is running out of oil; however this masks a number of deeper political issues.
The world is running out of oil is a convenient excuse for West's over consumption, to reduce consumption is considered the ultimate taboo. As more and more nations scramble for the ever dwindling supply of oil, this has exposed the West. The Western world consumes 50% of the 21st century's most important resource but produced less then a quarter of it. It is over consumption rather then China and India that are causing the crisis. The US specifically produced only 8% of the world's oil but consumes 25% of it
As US consumption continues to rise the competition for dwindling energy sources will intensify, this will make the Muslim lands even more important and as with Iraq, occupation may well be justified for stable supplies of the black stuff.
The third world is in poverty because their is not enough food in the world
Numerous organisations have researched into the general causes of poverty which range from the lack of resources to the nature of the local climate to the lack of democracy. There is generally no consensus on the causes by sociologists and think tanks however a dominant idea that exists is that only the diffusion of capitalism with its free markets is the cure. However a cursory glance at not just the Muslim world but the third world in general shows a handful of factors have played a large part in the poverty in the world today.
The role IMF and World Bank and their notorious structural adjustment policies in countries such as Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Egypt have directly aided some of the underlying economic problems. The general solution provided by such institutions is the engaging of trade to climb out of poverty. In reality there are a number of obstacles placed by the developed nations that ensure developing nations will never reach a level where they can compete. What this actually means is that Western goods should be imported rather than allow imports from poorer countries. The theory is that only via trade will nations pull themselves out of poverty. The development of a market economy with a greater role for the private sector was therefore seen as the key to stimulating economic growth and removing poverty.
As an example Pakistan actually required essential investments in health, education and infrastructure before they could compete internationally. The World Bank and IMF instead required Pakistan to reduce state support to these sectors and concentrate on exports. They insisted on pushing Pakistan into markets where they were unable to compete with the might of the international private sector. Such policies inevitably undermined the economic development of Pakistan.
Africa is being asked to repay it's a legacy of the colonial era. Africa's debt is partly the result of the unjust transfer to them of the debts of the colonizing states, in billions of dollars, at very high interest rates. It also originates from ‘odious debt', whereby debt was incurred as rich countries loaned funds to dictators and corrupt leaders when it was known that the money would be wasted. South Africa, for example inherited "apartheid-caused debt" at £28 billion (which is now $46 billion). Post Apartheid Africa was forced to repay debts incurred by the apartheid regime so, in effect, South Africans are paying for their own oppression. In 1998 ACTSA (Action for Southern Africa) estimated that the £11 billion (now $18 billion) that South Africa borrowed to maintain apartheid, and the £17 billion (now $28 billion) that the neighbouring states borrowed because of apartheid destabilisation and aggression now represents 74% of African debt owed.
Much of the situation in the Muslim world stems from the colonial era and is summed up best by David Fromkin, Professor and expert on Economic History at the University of Chicago "Massive amounts of the wealth of the old Ottoman Empire were now claimed by the victors. But one must remember that the Islamic empire had tried for centuries to conquer Christian Europe and the power brokers deciding the fate of those defeated people were naturally determined that these countries should never be able to organize and threaten Western interests again. With centuries of mercantilist experience, Britain and France created small, unstable states whose rulers needed their support to stay in power. The development and trade of these states were controlled and they were meant never again to be a threat to the West. These external powers then made contracts with their puppets to buy Arab resources cheaply, making the feudal elite enormously wealthy while leaving most citizens in poverty".[5]
The third world remains poor due to the policies of the West and will remain poor not because of a shortage of food but due to the excessive consumption of the West - the West with 20% of the world population consume 80% of the worlds agricultural production.
The United Nations upholding of international law makes it best placed to regulate international relations and solve international conflicts.
The UN was founded in 1945 primarily to ‘save succeeding generations from the scourge of war'. Since then there have been more then 250 conflicts worldwide, it is patently clear the UN has been unsuccessful for the purpose it was created for.
The West as well as many policymakers from the third world considers the UN a non-biased, internationally represented institution boasting nearly 200 member states, who uphold the beacon for the values of internationalism, multilateral action, democracy, pluralism, secularism, compromise, human rights and freedom. This could not be further from the truth.
The UN in reality is a tool of exploitation where it is manifestly apparent from the inherent structure of the organisation that it legitimises wholesale abuse by the colonialist, permanent members of the Security Council. Many events have undermined the UN. The invasion of Iraq, the selective application of international law on the State of Israel, the failure to stop the massacre of Srebrenica and ethnic cleansing in Rwanda under its watchful eye.
In reality the UN is an international organisation which the five permanent security members have used as an extension of their foreign policies. Also international law in reality does not exist, only international norms. For international law to exist enforcement must be possible at a global level, supranational level. As this does not exist we must expect nation-states to flout the regulations of the international agencies when it suits them - neo-realism (cf. Waltz. K. 1979. ‘A Theory of International Politics').
The third world need to liberalise their economies for them to develop
The last three decades have seen Capitalism dominate the international development scene. It has completely monopolised economic development and enforced its formula upon the world. The Asian tiger economies of China, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong are held regularly held as successful nations who adopted liberalism and progressed. The IMF alongside the World Bank proclaimed industrialisation and the diffusion of liberal economic ideas would transform traditional economies and societies. These influences would place poor countries on a path of development similar to that experienced by Western industrialised nations during the Industrial Revolution.
Today Poverty is the state for the majority of the world's people. 3 billion people in the world live on fewer than two dollars a day; another 1.3 billion people live on less than one dollar a day. 1.3 billion have no access to clean water; 3 billion have no access to sanitation and 2 billion have no access to electricity. Liberalism has actually been the cause of the wealth disparities in the world and the poverty the majority of the world's people face. A number of surveys have highlighted that liberlism has created even more poverty stricken people in the world. The 7th December 2006 saw the culmination of a global study - from the World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations. Some of its findings are staggering; by gathering research from countries all over the world the studies findings concluded that the richest 1% of the world owns 40% of the planet's wealth and that only 10% of the world's population owned 85% of the world's assets.[6]
Liberalism has resulted in the Western world feeding of the remainder of the world. Liberalism in no way helped alleviate poverty, it actually contributed to it, and hence any continuation of liberal economic policies in the third world will result in the poor getting even poorer.
Global warming is due to the development of India and China
Global warming and climate change refer to an increase in average global temperatures. Natural events and human activities are believed to be contributing to the increase in average global temperatures. This is caused primarily by increases in the greenhouse which is the rise in temperature on Earth as certain gases in the atmosphere trap energy gases such as Carbon Dioxide (CO2).
Every few years, leading climate scientists at the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have released major reports detailing the progress in understanding climate change. From the outset they have recommended that there be emission reductions. This body is comprised of hundreds of climate scientists from around the world. At the beginning of January 2007, the IPCC's fourth major report summarised that they were even more certain than before of human-induced climate change because of better scientific understanding; ‘The understanding of anthropogenic warming and cooling influences on climate has improved since the Third Assessment Report (TAR), leading to very high confidence that the globally averaged net effect of human activities since 1750 has been one of warming.' Their definition of "very high confidence" and "very likely" is a 90% chance of being correct. (Their 2001 report claimed a 66% certainty).
In terms of historical emissions, industrialised countries account for around 80% of the carbon dioxide buildup in the atmosphere to date. Since 1950, the US has emitted a cumulative total of roughly 50.7 billion tons of carbon, while China (4.6 times more populous) and India (3.5 times more populous) have emitted only 15.7 and 4.2 billion tons respectively. Annually, more than 60% of global industrial carbon dioxide emissions originate in industrialized countries, where only about 20% of the world's population resides.
Much of the growth in emissions in the developed world stem from rapid industrialisation from the industrial revolution era. The US with its $14 trillion economy is the world's largest polluter and has acted as an obstacle to any agreement on emission reduction targets. Reducing emissions would mean industry in the West would need to produce less - this would lead to the economies of the West to collapse rather then grow. To reduce consumption is considered Shirk in Capitalism. By the same token, the rate of consumption of fossil fuels in developed countries is also extremely high relative to the rest of the world. The depletion of non-renewable resources and environmental destruction is primarily caused by the consumption patterns of US. US consumption of fossil fuels is well over five times the global average.
Global warming is the result of rapid industrialisation from the West with the sole concern of profit making. Although there exist technologies that allow the development of clean low-emission industrial development, their costs are high and as a result have been unable to break into the mainstream market. China and India have only in the last 20 years have seen rapid development, global warming was already high prior to that, US continued attacks on China and India for developing too quickly in reality is attempts by the world superpower to stifle their development.
The Muslim world does not want Islam
For years the West argued Muslim across the world want democracy and freedom rather then Islam, they argued only a minority of people in Pakistan and Afghanistan want Islam, the majority of the world was smitten by the West and wants to live by Capitalism. However today it is modernist Muslims who argue the Muslim world do not want Islam and are not ready for it. The West on the other hand is convinced the Muslim world wants Islam and have begun the process of defending themselves from the emergence of such a threat.
The US national intelligence council published its report following its ‘global 2020' project, entitled ‘mapping the global future.' The national Intelligence council (NIC) is the American intelligence community's centre for mid-term and long-term strategic thinking. The report set out the likely scenario the world will face in 2020. The report concluded that the appeal of Islam today revolved around is call to return to earlier roots of Islam where the Islamic civilisation was at the forefront of global change under the khilafah. The report portrayed a fictional scenario ‘of how a global movement fuelled by radical religious identity could emerge.'[7] The report revealed unequivocally that at the highest levels of US policy planning preparation is being made for the emergence of the khilafah. Other reports from US policy makers and think tanks across the world acknowledged there is a broad based ideological movement seeking for the return of the Khilafah.
The CIA has already revitalized programs of covert action that once helped win the Cold War, targeting Islamic media, religious leaders, and political parties. The agency is receiving ‘an exponential increase in money, people, and assets' to help it influence Muslim societies.
At the same time various surveys, think tank reports and policy makers have all accepted that Muslims globally have rejected western values. This represents a glaring failure on the part of the West as it has faced no challenges to its global supremacy. This means the battle for hearts and minds and physical occupation represents a last ditch effort to salvage the emergence of an alternative system of governance.
The actins of the West clearly show rather then the Muslim wanting Islam; they are not very far from achieving such aims.
Israel is invincible, it has proven this in 4 wars, hence the Muslim world should accept its here to stay
Since its formation in 1948, the reality of Israel's military strength has been shrouded by a mythical aura of invincibility. Interestingly such myths have not been actively expressed by Israel, but have been given life by the actions of the treacherous Muslim rulers
Israel's performance in the wars of 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 against the Muslims in the region has long been seen as confirmation of Israel military superiority. In light of this apparent superiority and its seizure of Muslim lands, it is argued that direct military conflict with Israel is not a viable course of action for the Arab states, creating the necessity of entering into negotiations. The direct consequence of such a move has been the acceptance of Israel's sovereignty through plans such as the peace process.
In reviewing Israel's supposed military might one must keep in mind: What purpose does the construction of this myth serve?
1948 war - Israel's creation
The war of 1948 led to the establishment of the State of Israel. On the surface, one may find it difficult enough to understand how 40 million Arabs could not match the fighting strength of just 600,000 Jews. A closer study of the defenders of the Palestinian cause shows how their actions in fact led directly to the establishment of Israel.
The primary representatives of the Palestinian cause was King Abdullah of Transjordan, King Farook of Egypt and the Mufti of Palestine, all of them were extremely weak rulers subject to constant manipulation by the British. King Abdullah's portrayal of himself as a defender of the Palestinian cause was a façade. It was known he and Ben Gurion (Israel's first Prime Minister) were students together in Istanbul and that in clandestine meetings Abdullah had offered to accept the establishment of Israel in return for Jordanian control of the Arab populated parts of Palestine.
Abdullah had the Arab Legion at his disposal, a highly trained unit of 4,500 men, with General John Glubb an Englishman as its commanding officer. Glubb in his memoirs recounted that he was under strict orders from the British, not to enter areas under Jewish control. Egypt further weakened the attack against Israel when Nakrashi Pasha , the Prime Minister initially did not use existing military units but sent an army of volunteers that had only been organised in January of that year. Jordan had also delayed the passage of Iraqi troops across its territory thus thwarting any attack against Israel. This is why a blind Imam brought to rouse the Jordanian army prior to the battle embarrassed Abdullah when he said : "O army I wish you were ours." (referring to the Arab Legion being British)
Although the combined Muslim forces were 40,000 only 10,000 were trained soldiers. The Zionists had 30,000 armed personnel, 10,000 men for local defence and another 25,000 for home guard. Furthermore there were nearly 3,000 specially trained Irgun and Stern gang terrorists. They were armed with the latest weaponry and funded heavily through Zionist agencies in America and Britain. Despite the preparedness of the Jews, the treachery of the
Muslim rulers secured a foothold for the Jews in Palestine.
The 1956 Suez Canal crisis
This conflict was never a war for the liberation of Palestine but rather a struggle between America and Britain for control of the strategically important Suez Canal.
The US saw Egypt as a critical ally if America was to gain influence in the Middle East. Through the CIA, she moved to depose the Pro British King Farook in a coup in 1952, bringing into power the Free Officers who were soon afterwards led by Nasser. The CIA worked on a project in 1951 known as "The Search for a Moslem Billy Graham." Mike Copeland the CIA operative, published classified information in his memoirs in 1989, The Game Player, about The CIA supported coup d'etat that ousted the British puppet King Farook. Copeland, who activated the project, explains that ‘the CIA needed a charismatic leader who would be able to divert the growing anti-American hostility that was building up in the area.' He explains both the CIA and Nasser were in agreement on Israel. For Nasser talk of war with Israel was irrelevant. Much more of a priority was British occupation of the Suez Canal Zone. Nasser's enemy was Britain.
In 1956 Nasser carried out American demands of nationalising the Suez Canal. The response of Britain was to lure France and Israel into the struggle. This was outlined by historian Corelli Barnett, who wrote about the Suez in his book, ‘The Collapse of British Power,' ‘France was hostile to Nasser because Egypt was helping the Algerian rebels, and attached to the canal for historical reasons. After all, a Frenchman built it. Israel was longing to have a go at Nasser anyway because of Palestinian fedayeen attacks and the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran.' so Sir Anthony Eden (British Prime Minister) concocted a secret tripartite plot with France and Israel. [8] He further explained ‘that Israel would invade Egypt across the Sinai Peninsula.' ‘Britain and France would then give an ultimatum to the parties to stop fighting or they would intervene to 'protect' the canal.[9]
The US and USSR exercised diplomatic pressure to force Britain to withdraw. Russia directly threatened Paris and London with nuclear attacks. The immense international pressure forced the British and French to withdraw and consequently lose their footing in Egypt. The American administration, under Eisenhower, went as far as threatening the Israelis with economic sanctions if they did not withdraw from occupied territory seized from Egypt, a measure that would have had disastrous consequences on Israel at the time. In the aftermath of the crisis, America emerged as the dominant force in the Middle East.
1967 six day war
This war was again another episode in the Anglo-American conflict for control of the region. Britain had been surpassed as the region's dominant force 11 years earlier, but still retained some influence through its agents in Jordan, Syria and Israel. In an attempt to weaken Nasser, Britain sought to lure Israel to drag Egypt into a war whereby Israel would seize territory and use it as a bargaining tool in a land for peace settlement, a means through which to achieve the security which the Israelis so desperately sought. On 5 June 1967 Israel launched a pre-emptive strike destroying 60% of Egypt's grounded air force and 66% of Syrian and Jordanian combat aircraft.
From Jordan the Israelis seized the West Bank and east Jerusalem. King Hussein, prior to the battle, had positioned his troops in different areas from where the main battle was taking place. In a matter of 48 hours the Israelis seized the major West Bank towns and most of those who were shot dead of the Jordanian forces were in retreat. In a similar manner the Israelis seized the Golan Heights on the 6th day of the war. The Syrian troops occupying the Golan Heights heard news of Israel's capture of the strategically important heights through their own State radio announcing the Israeli capture of the heights while the Syrian troops were still clearly occupying them. Israel also dealt America's Nasser a blow by capturing Sharm al Sheikh and securing the waterway of the Straits of Tiran. The objective of weakening the regime of Nasser was achieved, thus indirectly aiding British interests within the region. Israel was able to seize more land and use it as a bargaining asset in any land for peace negotiations, which today is still used as a basis for negotiations rather then the status of 1948.
1973 war: more treachery by the rulers
An examination of the October 1973 war launched by Egypt and Syria against Israel shows that the aims were limited and never included the liberation of Palestine. The aims never even included the liberation of the Golan Heights which were designed to be restored as part of a peace treaty between Syria and Israel. The aims were to solidify the positions of Anwar Sadat and Hafez al Assad who were relatively new leaders in countries prone to military coups. Sadat in particular was vulnerable given the fact that he had succeeded the charismatic Nasser.
Mohammed Heikal the respected editor of Al Ahram from 1957 - 1974, who witnessed the war, he explained the extent of Anwar Sadats underlying motives in his book ‘The Road to Ramadhan' where he cites Sadat's mood in the run up to the war. Heikal quotes one of Sadat's generals, Mohammed Fouwzi who gave the analogy of a samurai drawing two swords - a long one and short one in preparation for battle. Fouwzi said that this battle would be a case of the short sword, signifying a limited battle for certain motives.
Anwar Sadat had no intention of having a protracted war of liberation with Israel. This is why he sought peace with Israel whilst commanding a winning position in the war. In the first 24 hours of the war Egypt smashed through the Israeli's much heralded Bar-Lev fortifications east of the Suez canal with only 68 casualties. Meanwhile 2 Syrian divisions and 500 tanks swept into the Golan Heights and retook some of the land captured in 1967. In two days of fighting Israel had lost 49 aircraft and 500 tanks. In the midst of this Sadat sent a message to US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in which he said that the objective of the war was ‘the achievement of peace in the Middle East and not...partial settlements.' The message went on to state that if Israel withdrew from all occupied territories Egypt would be prepared to participate in a Peace conference under UN or neutral auspices.
Thus despite having an immense strategic advantage Sadat was in the mood for negotiation in this early stage. Sadat's refusal to press home his initial advantage and his delay in launching the second Sinai offensive allowed Israel to mobilise with aid from the US and she began to seize back lost territory. Hostilities formally came to an end on 25 October after Israel had violated previous cease-fire agreements.
All the wars with Israel best illustrate how the Muslim rulers have never seriously fought Israel with the intention of liberating Palestine, all the mentioned examples illustrate the reality behind the myths which the Ummah has been led to believe. The real treachery has been committed by the insincere rulers who have collaborated and helped create the myth of Israeli superiority, kindling it, nurturing it and maintaining it. The wars the Arab world fought show that the Muslim countries have never singularly nor collectively fought Israel with the intention of destroying it. Each of the wars was conducted in order to meet specific objectives, none of which were to liberate the land of Palestine and eliminate Israel. Hence the objective of seriously threatening Israel was never an aim, despite the unquestionable strength of the combined Arab armies.
Conclusions
History is always written by the victors, this is also the case with geopolitics. There are many myths that still exist including the reasons for WW1 and WW2 and apart from deceiving the world of the West's invincibility; this is also a very useful tool to continue to fool the host populations in the West. US superiority has taken a major hit due to the Iraq and Afghanistan war, as well as Israel's invincibility with its defeat at the hands of Hizbullah in 2006. Muslims should bear in mind that however dire the situation may look globally for the ummah, much of this picture is a mirage and can very easily be changed and replaced.
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[1] "The ins and outs: The EU's most effective foreign-policy instrument has been enlargement. But how far can it go?" The Economist, March 2007, http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displaystory.cfm?subjectid=682266&story_id=8808134
[2] US Ambassador Warren Zimmerman in an interview with the Croatian daily Danas, 12 January 1992, reprinted at http://www.emperors-clothes.com/interviews/nothing.htm
[3] Karen Talbot ‘Backing up Globalization with Military Might' New World Order Onslaught, Covert Action Quarterly, Issue 68, Fall 1999, retrieved 22nd May 2008, http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Articles/Backing.asp
[4] Benjamin Schwarz & Christopher Layne ‘The Case Against Intervention in Kosovo,' the nation, 19th April 1999, retrieved 22nd May 2008, http://www.thenation.com/doc/19990419/schwarz/single
[5] Fromkin D, A Peace to End All Peace, p 45, New York: Avon Books, 1989
[6] www.iariw.org/papers/2006/davies.pdf
[7] National Intelligence Estimate, December 2004, Report of the National Intelligence Councils 2020 project, ‘Mapping the Global Future,' Pg 83-92, retrieved 26th October 2007, http://www.foia.cia.gov/2020/2020.pdf
[8] Barnett C (1972) ‘The Collapse of British Power,' Macmillan, ISBN 0333679822, and also Paul Reynolds, ‘Suez: End of empire.'
[9] Barnett C (1972) ‘The Collapse of British Power,' Macmillan, ISBN 0333679822
Source
Geopolitics has traditionally been the study of the relationship and links between political power and geographic space. The doctrine of Geopolitics gained attention largely through the work of Sir Halford Mackinder in England and his formulation of the Heartland Theory in 1904, which in reference to the British Empire at the time explored the significance of sea power in world conflict.
Whilst politics looks at the application of power, geopolitics looks at power in relation to places and resources. The Western world has dominated the geopolitical scene since the beginning of the 20th century. This has led to the creation of a number of myths, whilst a number of narratives also hide the underlying problems with the Western world. As aware Muslims we should be acquainted with the global situation for not only is this necessary for the defence of the ummah and Islam, it also exposes the weakness of the Capitalist West.
What follows is a list of such myths:-
The world is over populated
The rate of population growth over the last century has been labelled the underlying cause of the world standing on the brink of disaster; it is argued we are running out of food to sustain such growing population. It is argued by the proponents of over-population that the huge growth in world population is responsible for poverty, environmental destruction and social unrest. Economic development in the third world is impossible as long as populations continue to grow as a result international agencies and governments have developed numerous programmes to curtail the rate of population growth, all of these have been implemented in the third world.
This alleged over-population has to be in relation to something to qualify it being over. That something is the use of resources. The resources being consumed leading to global imbalances are attributed to population sizes.
When all assumptions on the effects of population growth are scrutinised population increases in no way has ever contributed to the many ills of the world today and what becomes clear is that there is a clear political agenda in attributing the increasing global population as the cause of the worlds potential disaster. This agenda is to shift the real cause away from the lifestyles, living patterns, un-sustainability of consumerism, poverty and blatant abuse of the Third world in order that the western world can live of the third world.
The developed world also faces a very series conundrum; Japan, Russia, Germany, Switzerland and much of Eastern Europe are experiencing population decline, due to a huge reduction in births. The rest of the Western world would also have declining populations was it not for immigration. As population numbers decline in the West relative to the third world and Muslim world such countries will have a legitimate right based upon their numbers to demand greater say in so called international institutes and representation on international bodies. The issue of overpopulation is a very useful tool to vilify nations with rising populations and at the same time protecting its potential loss of future influence. This can be seen clearly with Turkish EU accession, upon joining the EU, Turkey's almost 70 million inhabitants would bestow it the second largest number of MEPs in the European Parliament. In addition Demographic projections indicate Turkey would surpass Germany in the number of seats by 2020. Turkey's membership would have wide ranging consequences for the future direction of the EU including the thorny issue of future enlargement plans, grounds by which Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of France has opposed Turkey's admission.[1] d' Estaing has suggested that it would lead to demands for accession by Morocco.
The world in not overpopulated, the West just consumes too much
Western intervention in the Balkans in the 1990's was in order to help Muslims
The NATO attack on Yugoslavia in 1993, was presented by the West as the consequence of Yugoslavia's stubborn refusal to settle for any reasonable peace plan - in particular its rejection of plans for an international security force to implement a peace plan in Kosovo. Intervention by the West and then the eventual bombing campaign by NATO is continually held as evidence that the current ‘war on terror' is not a war on Islam and how the West will intervene across the world for ‘humanitarian' purposes even helping Muslims as they apparently did in 1993. In reality the geopolitical aims were very different. The political instability in the Balkans during the 1990's was exacerbated by American determination to reduce Russia's influence in the region, increase Europe's dependency upon her and confer new legitimacy to NATO when it appeared increasingly redundant after the Cold War.
The Western powers and specifically both the US and Britain worked for the fragmentation of Yugoslavia as was revealed by the then US Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmerman in January 1992 before the outbreak of hostilities ‘we are aiming for a dissolution of Yugoslavia into independent states.'[2] On the 18th March 1992 the EU brokered a deal in Lisbon among Bosnian Muslims, Croatian and Serb communities partitioning the Serb republic into three ethnically based cantons which would act as a confederation functioning as an independent state. This agreement was sabotaged by the US which urged the Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic to renege the deal by declaring statehood saying ‘this was justified by the referendum on March 1st .' Jose Cutileiro, sectary general of the Western European union confirmed ‘to be fair President Alija Izethbegovics and his aids were encouraged to scupper the deal and to fight for a unitary Bosnian state by Western mediators.' This is what caused the Bosnian civil war.
Today 11 000 troops are stationed in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia for peace, however such troops have ensured US economic interests are secured. Former US congressman Lee Hamilton commented in the New York Times ‘we have completely taken over the control of the Balkans. US officials exercise managing functions all states of the former Yugoslavia. We are virtually the pro consul.' Karen Talbot geopolitical expert confirmed "the determination by the U.S and NATO, at all costs, to occupy Kosovo and virtually all of Yugoslavia, is spurred on by the enticement of abundant natural resources. Kosovo alone has the richest mineral resources in all of Europe west of Russia. The New York Times observed that "the sprawling state-owned Trepca mining complex, the most valuable piece of real estate in the Balkans, is worth at least $5 billion." producing gold, silver, pure lead, zinc, cadmium, as well as tens of millions of dollars in profits annually. "Kosovo also possesses 17 billion tons of coal reserves and Kosovo (like Serbia and Albania) also has oil reserves."[3] President Bill Clinton at the time let slip ‘If we are going to have a strong economic relationship that includes our ability to sell around the world, Europe has got to be a key...That‘s what the Kosovo thing was all about.'[4]
Since the bombing has ended, numerous US bases in the Balkans have been set up. A military base is being built in Kosovo, described as the largest US foreign base built since the Vietnam War. US domination of NATO meant intervention by NATO forces in the Balkans would ensure US influence in the region. A leaked version of the Pentagon's 1994-1999 Defense Planning Guidance report advises that the United States ‘must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO ... Therefore, it is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO as the primary instrument of Western defense and security, as well as the channel for US influence and participation in European security affairs.'
This all confirms the influence of Russia, the oil in the Caspian sea and the revitalisation of NATO (to continue US influence) where the geopolitical aims behind US and Western intervention, the lives of thousands of innocent people, the lives of the slaughtered in Srebrenica were a price worth paying for continued US dominance.
The world is running out of Oil
The struggle for global supremacy between Germany and Britain at the beginning of the 20th century drove them to search for alternative fuels to power the bulky coal based war machines. The discovery of oil fields in the Middle East in the 1920's spurred a century of new technologies, created new patterns of society and consumption and changed the global balance of power.
However like oil fossil fuels they are limited and will eventually finish. For the most part of the 20th century this was never a discussion as most of the worlds oil will still not discovered, technologies such as the fighter jet, tanks, automobiles were all designed to run on oil, apart from oil prices exploding if oil was drying up, such technologies would also become redundant.
Peak oil was fist introduced in the 1970's, this is the point where half of the known oil has been consumed, and at the time this view wad ridiculed and labelled a fringe view. Today it is considered a mainstream view and the world is running out of oil is considered a geopolitical headache for the world. No doubt the world is running out of oil; however this masks a number of deeper political issues.
The world is running out of oil is a convenient excuse for West's over consumption, to reduce consumption is considered the ultimate taboo. As more and more nations scramble for the ever dwindling supply of oil, this has exposed the West. The Western world consumes 50% of the 21st century's most important resource but produced less then a quarter of it. It is over consumption rather then China and India that are causing the crisis. The US specifically produced only 8% of the world's oil but consumes 25% of it
As US consumption continues to rise the competition for dwindling energy sources will intensify, this will make the Muslim lands even more important and as with Iraq, occupation may well be justified for stable supplies of the black stuff.
The third world is in poverty because their is not enough food in the world
Numerous organisations have researched into the general causes of poverty which range from the lack of resources to the nature of the local climate to the lack of democracy. There is generally no consensus on the causes by sociologists and think tanks however a dominant idea that exists is that only the diffusion of capitalism with its free markets is the cure. However a cursory glance at not just the Muslim world but the third world in general shows a handful of factors have played a large part in the poverty in the world today.
The role IMF and World Bank and their notorious structural adjustment policies in countries such as Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Egypt have directly aided some of the underlying economic problems. The general solution provided by such institutions is the engaging of trade to climb out of poverty. In reality there are a number of obstacles placed by the developed nations that ensure developing nations will never reach a level where they can compete. What this actually means is that Western goods should be imported rather than allow imports from poorer countries. The theory is that only via trade will nations pull themselves out of poverty. The development of a market economy with a greater role for the private sector was therefore seen as the key to stimulating economic growth and removing poverty.
As an example Pakistan actually required essential investments in health, education and infrastructure before they could compete internationally. The World Bank and IMF instead required Pakistan to reduce state support to these sectors and concentrate on exports. They insisted on pushing Pakistan into markets where they were unable to compete with the might of the international private sector. Such policies inevitably undermined the economic development of Pakistan.
Africa is being asked to repay it's a legacy of the colonial era. Africa's debt is partly the result of the unjust transfer to them of the debts of the colonizing states, in billions of dollars, at very high interest rates. It also originates from ‘odious debt', whereby debt was incurred as rich countries loaned funds to dictators and corrupt leaders when it was known that the money would be wasted. South Africa, for example inherited "apartheid-caused debt" at £28 billion (which is now $46 billion). Post Apartheid Africa was forced to repay debts incurred by the apartheid regime so, in effect, South Africans are paying for their own oppression. In 1998 ACTSA (Action for Southern Africa) estimated that the £11 billion (now $18 billion) that South Africa borrowed to maintain apartheid, and the £17 billion (now $28 billion) that the neighbouring states borrowed because of apartheid destabilisation and aggression now represents 74% of African debt owed.
Much of the situation in the Muslim world stems from the colonial era and is summed up best by David Fromkin, Professor and expert on Economic History at the University of Chicago "Massive amounts of the wealth of the old Ottoman Empire were now claimed by the victors. But one must remember that the Islamic empire had tried for centuries to conquer Christian Europe and the power brokers deciding the fate of those defeated people were naturally determined that these countries should never be able to organize and threaten Western interests again. With centuries of mercantilist experience, Britain and France created small, unstable states whose rulers needed their support to stay in power. The development and trade of these states were controlled and they were meant never again to be a threat to the West. These external powers then made contracts with their puppets to buy Arab resources cheaply, making the feudal elite enormously wealthy while leaving most citizens in poverty".[5]
The third world remains poor due to the policies of the West and will remain poor not because of a shortage of food but due to the excessive consumption of the West - the West with 20% of the world population consume 80% of the worlds agricultural production.
The United Nations upholding of international law makes it best placed to regulate international relations and solve international conflicts.
The UN was founded in 1945 primarily to ‘save succeeding generations from the scourge of war'. Since then there have been more then 250 conflicts worldwide, it is patently clear the UN has been unsuccessful for the purpose it was created for.
The West as well as many policymakers from the third world considers the UN a non-biased, internationally represented institution boasting nearly 200 member states, who uphold the beacon for the values of internationalism, multilateral action, democracy, pluralism, secularism, compromise, human rights and freedom. This could not be further from the truth.
The UN in reality is a tool of exploitation where it is manifestly apparent from the inherent structure of the organisation that it legitimises wholesale abuse by the colonialist, permanent members of the Security Council. Many events have undermined the UN. The invasion of Iraq, the selective application of international law on the State of Israel, the failure to stop the massacre of Srebrenica and ethnic cleansing in Rwanda under its watchful eye.
In reality the UN is an international organisation which the five permanent security members have used as an extension of their foreign policies. Also international law in reality does not exist, only international norms. For international law to exist enforcement must be possible at a global level, supranational level. As this does not exist we must expect nation-states to flout the regulations of the international agencies when it suits them - neo-realism (cf. Waltz. K. 1979. ‘A Theory of International Politics').
The third world need to liberalise their economies for them to develop
The last three decades have seen Capitalism dominate the international development scene. It has completely monopolised economic development and enforced its formula upon the world. The Asian tiger economies of China, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong are held regularly held as successful nations who adopted liberalism and progressed. The IMF alongside the World Bank proclaimed industrialisation and the diffusion of liberal economic ideas would transform traditional economies and societies. These influences would place poor countries on a path of development similar to that experienced by Western industrialised nations during the Industrial Revolution.
Today Poverty is the state for the majority of the world's people. 3 billion people in the world live on fewer than two dollars a day; another 1.3 billion people live on less than one dollar a day. 1.3 billion have no access to clean water; 3 billion have no access to sanitation and 2 billion have no access to electricity. Liberalism has actually been the cause of the wealth disparities in the world and the poverty the majority of the world's people face. A number of surveys have highlighted that liberlism has created even more poverty stricken people in the world. The 7th December 2006 saw the culmination of a global study - from the World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations. Some of its findings are staggering; by gathering research from countries all over the world the studies findings concluded that the richest 1% of the world owns 40% of the planet's wealth and that only 10% of the world's population owned 85% of the world's assets.[6]
Liberalism has resulted in the Western world feeding of the remainder of the world. Liberalism in no way helped alleviate poverty, it actually contributed to it, and hence any continuation of liberal economic policies in the third world will result in the poor getting even poorer.
Global warming is due to the development of India and China
Global warming and climate change refer to an increase in average global temperatures. Natural events and human activities are believed to be contributing to the increase in average global temperatures. This is caused primarily by increases in the greenhouse which is the rise in temperature on Earth as certain gases in the atmosphere trap energy gases such as Carbon Dioxide (CO2).
Every few years, leading climate scientists at the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have released major reports detailing the progress in understanding climate change. From the outset they have recommended that there be emission reductions. This body is comprised of hundreds of climate scientists from around the world. At the beginning of January 2007, the IPCC's fourth major report summarised that they were even more certain than before of human-induced climate change because of better scientific understanding; ‘The understanding of anthropogenic warming and cooling influences on climate has improved since the Third Assessment Report (TAR), leading to very high confidence that the globally averaged net effect of human activities since 1750 has been one of warming.' Their definition of "very high confidence" and "very likely" is a 90% chance of being correct. (Their 2001 report claimed a 66% certainty).
In terms of historical emissions, industrialised countries account for around 80% of the carbon dioxide buildup in the atmosphere to date. Since 1950, the US has emitted a cumulative total of roughly 50.7 billion tons of carbon, while China (4.6 times more populous) and India (3.5 times more populous) have emitted only 15.7 and 4.2 billion tons respectively. Annually, more than 60% of global industrial carbon dioxide emissions originate in industrialized countries, where only about 20% of the world's population resides.
Much of the growth in emissions in the developed world stem from rapid industrialisation from the industrial revolution era. The US with its $14 trillion economy is the world's largest polluter and has acted as an obstacle to any agreement on emission reduction targets. Reducing emissions would mean industry in the West would need to produce less - this would lead to the economies of the West to collapse rather then grow. To reduce consumption is considered Shirk in Capitalism. By the same token, the rate of consumption of fossil fuels in developed countries is also extremely high relative to the rest of the world. The depletion of non-renewable resources and environmental destruction is primarily caused by the consumption patterns of US. US consumption of fossil fuels is well over five times the global average.
Global warming is the result of rapid industrialisation from the West with the sole concern of profit making. Although there exist technologies that allow the development of clean low-emission industrial development, their costs are high and as a result have been unable to break into the mainstream market. China and India have only in the last 20 years have seen rapid development, global warming was already high prior to that, US continued attacks on China and India for developing too quickly in reality is attempts by the world superpower to stifle their development.
The Muslim world does not want Islam
For years the West argued Muslim across the world want democracy and freedom rather then Islam, they argued only a minority of people in Pakistan and Afghanistan want Islam, the majority of the world was smitten by the West and wants to live by Capitalism. However today it is modernist Muslims who argue the Muslim world do not want Islam and are not ready for it. The West on the other hand is convinced the Muslim world wants Islam and have begun the process of defending themselves from the emergence of such a threat.
The US national intelligence council published its report following its ‘global 2020' project, entitled ‘mapping the global future.' The national Intelligence council (NIC) is the American intelligence community's centre for mid-term and long-term strategic thinking. The report set out the likely scenario the world will face in 2020. The report concluded that the appeal of Islam today revolved around is call to return to earlier roots of Islam where the Islamic civilisation was at the forefront of global change under the khilafah. The report portrayed a fictional scenario ‘of how a global movement fuelled by radical religious identity could emerge.'[7] The report revealed unequivocally that at the highest levels of US policy planning preparation is being made for the emergence of the khilafah. Other reports from US policy makers and think tanks across the world acknowledged there is a broad based ideological movement seeking for the return of the Khilafah.
The CIA has already revitalized programs of covert action that once helped win the Cold War, targeting Islamic media, religious leaders, and political parties. The agency is receiving ‘an exponential increase in money, people, and assets' to help it influence Muslim societies.
At the same time various surveys, think tank reports and policy makers have all accepted that Muslims globally have rejected western values. This represents a glaring failure on the part of the West as it has faced no challenges to its global supremacy. This means the battle for hearts and minds and physical occupation represents a last ditch effort to salvage the emergence of an alternative system of governance.
The actins of the West clearly show rather then the Muslim wanting Islam; they are not very far from achieving such aims.
Israel is invincible, it has proven this in 4 wars, hence the Muslim world should accept its here to stay
Since its formation in 1948, the reality of Israel's military strength has been shrouded by a mythical aura of invincibility. Interestingly such myths have not been actively expressed by Israel, but have been given life by the actions of the treacherous Muslim rulers
Israel's performance in the wars of 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 against the Muslims in the region has long been seen as confirmation of Israel military superiority. In light of this apparent superiority and its seizure of Muslim lands, it is argued that direct military conflict with Israel is not a viable course of action for the Arab states, creating the necessity of entering into negotiations. The direct consequence of such a move has been the acceptance of Israel's sovereignty through plans such as the peace process.
In reviewing Israel's supposed military might one must keep in mind: What purpose does the construction of this myth serve?
1948 war - Israel's creation
The war of 1948 led to the establishment of the State of Israel. On the surface, one may find it difficult enough to understand how 40 million Arabs could not match the fighting strength of just 600,000 Jews. A closer study of the defenders of the Palestinian cause shows how their actions in fact led directly to the establishment of Israel.
The primary representatives of the Palestinian cause was King Abdullah of Transjordan, King Farook of Egypt and the Mufti of Palestine, all of them were extremely weak rulers subject to constant manipulation by the British. King Abdullah's portrayal of himself as a defender of the Palestinian cause was a façade. It was known he and Ben Gurion (Israel's first Prime Minister) were students together in Istanbul and that in clandestine meetings Abdullah had offered to accept the establishment of Israel in return for Jordanian control of the Arab populated parts of Palestine.
Abdullah had the Arab Legion at his disposal, a highly trained unit of 4,500 men, with General John Glubb an Englishman as its commanding officer. Glubb in his memoirs recounted that he was under strict orders from the British, not to enter areas under Jewish control. Egypt further weakened the attack against Israel when Nakrashi Pasha , the Prime Minister initially did not use existing military units but sent an army of volunteers that had only been organised in January of that year. Jordan had also delayed the passage of Iraqi troops across its territory thus thwarting any attack against Israel. This is why a blind Imam brought to rouse the Jordanian army prior to the battle embarrassed Abdullah when he said : "O army I wish you were ours." (referring to the Arab Legion being British)
Although the combined Muslim forces were 40,000 only 10,000 were trained soldiers. The Zionists had 30,000 armed personnel, 10,000 men for local defence and another 25,000 for home guard. Furthermore there were nearly 3,000 specially trained Irgun and Stern gang terrorists. They were armed with the latest weaponry and funded heavily through Zionist agencies in America and Britain. Despite the preparedness of the Jews, the treachery of the
Muslim rulers secured a foothold for the Jews in Palestine.
The 1956 Suez Canal crisis
This conflict was never a war for the liberation of Palestine but rather a struggle between America and Britain for control of the strategically important Suez Canal.
The US saw Egypt as a critical ally if America was to gain influence in the Middle East. Through the CIA, she moved to depose the Pro British King Farook in a coup in 1952, bringing into power the Free Officers who were soon afterwards led by Nasser. The CIA worked on a project in 1951 known as "The Search for a Moslem Billy Graham." Mike Copeland the CIA operative, published classified information in his memoirs in 1989, The Game Player, about The CIA supported coup d'etat that ousted the British puppet King Farook. Copeland, who activated the project, explains that ‘the CIA needed a charismatic leader who would be able to divert the growing anti-American hostility that was building up in the area.' He explains both the CIA and Nasser were in agreement on Israel. For Nasser talk of war with Israel was irrelevant. Much more of a priority was British occupation of the Suez Canal Zone. Nasser's enemy was Britain.
In 1956 Nasser carried out American demands of nationalising the Suez Canal. The response of Britain was to lure France and Israel into the struggle. This was outlined by historian Corelli Barnett, who wrote about the Suez in his book, ‘The Collapse of British Power,' ‘France was hostile to Nasser because Egypt was helping the Algerian rebels, and attached to the canal for historical reasons. After all, a Frenchman built it. Israel was longing to have a go at Nasser anyway because of Palestinian fedayeen attacks and the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran.' so Sir Anthony Eden (British Prime Minister) concocted a secret tripartite plot with France and Israel. [8] He further explained ‘that Israel would invade Egypt across the Sinai Peninsula.' ‘Britain and France would then give an ultimatum to the parties to stop fighting or they would intervene to 'protect' the canal.[9]
The US and USSR exercised diplomatic pressure to force Britain to withdraw. Russia directly threatened Paris and London with nuclear attacks. The immense international pressure forced the British and French to withdraw and consequently lose their footing in Egypt. The American administration, under Eisenhower, went as far as threatening the Israelis with economic sanctions if they did not withdraw from occupied territory seized from Egypt, a measure that would have had disastrous consequences on Israel at the time. In the aftermath of the crisis, America emerged as the dominant force in the Middle East.
1967 six day war
This war was again another episode in the Anglo-American conflict for control of the region. Britain had been surpassed as the region's dominant force 11 years earlier, but still retained some influence through its agents in Jordan, Syria and Israel. In an attempt to weaken Nasser, Britain sought to lure Israel to drag Egypt into a war whereby Israel would seize territory and use it as a bargaining tool in a land for peace settlement, a means through which to achieve the security which the Israelis so desperately sought. On 5 June 1967 Israel launched a pre-emptive strike destroying 60% of Egypt's grounded air force and 66% of Syrian and Jordanian combat aircraft.
From Jordan the Israelis seized the West Bank and east Jerusalem. King Hussein, prior to the battle, had positioned his troops in different areas from where the main battle was taking place. In a matter of 48 hours the Israelis seized the major West Bank towns and most of those who were shot dead of the Jordanian forces were in retreat. In a similar manner the Israelis seized the Golan Heights on the 6th day of the war. The Syrian troops occupying the Golan Heights heard news of Israel's capture of the strategically important heights through their own State radio announcing the Israeli capture of the heights while the Syrian troops were still clearly occupying them. Israel also dealt America's Nasser a blow by capturing Sharm al Sheikh and securing the waterway of the Straits of Tiran. The objective of weakening the regime of Nasser was achieved, thus indirectly aiding British interests within the region. Israel was able to seize more land and use it as a bargaining asset in any land for peace negotiations, which today is still used as a basis for negotiations rather then the status of 1948.
1973 war: more treachery by the rulers
An examination of the October 1973 war launched by Egypt and Syria against Israel shows that the aims were limited and never included the liberation of Palestine. The aims never even included the liberation of the Golan Heights which were designed to be restored as part of a peace treaty between Syria and Israel. The aims were to solidify the positions of Anwar Sadat and Hafez al Assad who were relatively new leaders in countries prone to military coups. Sadat in particular was vulnerable given the fact that he had succeeded the charismatic Nasser.
Mohammed Heikal the respected editor of Al Ahram from 1957 - 1974, who witnessed the war, he explained the extent of Anwar Sadats underlying motives in his book ‘The Road to Ramadhan' where he cites Sadat's mood in the run up to the war. Heikal quotes one of Sadat's generals, Mohammed Fouwzi who gave the analogy of a samurai drawing two swords - a long one and short one in preparation for battle. Fouwzi said that this battle would be a case of the short sword, signifying a limited battle for certain motives.
Anwar Sadat had no intention of having a protracted war of liberation with Israel. This is why he sought peace with Israel whilst commanding a winning position in the war. In the first 24 hours of the war Egypt smashed through the Israeli's much heralded Bar-Lev fortifications east of the Suez canal with only 68 casualties. Meanwhile 2 Syrian divisions and 500 tanks swept into the Golan Heights and retook some of the land captured in 1967. In two days of fighting Israel had lost 49 aircraft and 500 tanks. In the midst of this Sadat sent a message to US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in which he said that the objective of the war was ‘the achievement of peace in the Middle East and not...partial settlements.' The message went on to state that if Israel withdrew from all occupied territories Egypt would be prepared to participate in a Peace conference under UN or neutral auspices.
Thus despite having an immense strategic advantage Sadat was in the mood for negotiation in this early stage. Sadat's refusal to press home his initial advantage and his delay in launching the second Sinai offensive allowed Israel to mobilise with aid from the US and she began to seize back lost territory. Hostilities formally came to an end on 25 October after Israel had violated previous cease-fire agreements.
All the wars with Israel best illustrate how the Muslim rulers have never seriously fought Israel with the intention of liberating Palestine, all the mentioned examples illustrate the reality behind the myths which the Ummah has been led to believe. The real treachery has been committed by the insincere rulers who have collaborated and helped create the myth of Israeli superiority, kindling it, nurturing it and maintaining it. The wars the Arab world fought show that the Muslim countries have never singularly nor collectively fought Israel with the intention of destroying it. Each of the wars was conducted in order to meet specific objectives, none of which were to liberate the land of Palestine and eliminate Israel. Hence the objective of seriously threatening Israel was never an aim, despite the unquestionable strength of the combined Arab armies.
Conclusions
History is always written by the victors, this is also the case with geopolitics. There are many myths that still exist including the reasons for WW1 and WW2 and apart from deceiving the world of the West's invincibility; this is also a very useful tool to continue to fool the host populations in the West. US superiority has taken a major hit due to the Iraq and Afghanistan war, as well as Israel's invincibility with its defeat at the hands of Hizbullah in 2006. Muslims should bear in mind that however dire the situation may look globally for the ummah, much of this picture is a mirage and can very easily be changed and replaced.
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[1] "The ins and outs: The EU's most effective foreign-policy instrument has been enlargement. But how far can it go?" The Economist, March 2007, http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displaystory.cfm?subjectid=682266&story_id=8808134
[2] US Ambassador Warren Zimmerman in an interview with the Croatian daily Danas, 12 January 1992, reprinted at http://www.emperors-clothes.com/interviews/nothing.htm
[3] Karen Talbot ‘Backing up Globalization with Military Might' New World Order Onslaught, Covert Action Quarterly, Issue 68, Fall 1999, retrieved 22nd May 2008, http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Articles/Backing.asp
[4] Benjamin Schwarz & Christopher Layne ‘The Case Against Intervention in Kosovo,' the nation, 19th April 1999, retrieved 22nd May 2008, http://www.thenation.com/doc/19990419/schwarz/single
[5] Fromkin D, A Peace to End All Peace, p 45, New York: Avon Books, 1989
[6] www.iariw.org/papers/2006/davies.pdf
[7] National Intelligence Estimate, December 2004, Report of the National Intelligence Councils 2020 project, ‘Mapping the Global Future,' Pg 83-92, retrieved 26th October 2007, http://www.foia.cia.gov/2020/2020.pdf
[8] Barnett C (1972) ‘The Collapse of British Power,' Macmillan, ISBN 0333679822, and also Paul Reynolds, ‘Suez: End of empire.'
[9] Barnett C (1972) ‘The Collapse of British Power,' Macmillan, ISBN 0333679822
Source
Monday, June 9, 2008
The fallacies of mainstream political processes
Islamist Political Activism in Jordan: Moderation, Militancy, and Democracy
By Curtis C. Ryan
While democracy has proven to be a fragile and elusive form of politics in the modern Arab world, Islamist movements have flourished–ranging from grass-roots pro-democracy activism to militant jihadism and terrorism. Whether Arab politics witnesses more political liberalization in the near future will depend in large part on the nature of Islamist movements, as well as ruling regimes’ reactions to them. This article examines the broad range of Islamist alternatives within one of the more liberalizing Arab states–the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan–with a view to understanding the depth and breadth of Islamist forms of political mobilization.
The Islamist movement in Jordan has a history and heritage as old as that of the Hashemite regime itself. While Jordan’s main Islamist political party–the Islamic Action Front (Jabha al-Amal al-Islami or IAF)–was not legalized until the early 1990s, Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) maintained a functional relationship with the Hashemite monarchy especially throughout the reign of King Hussein (1953-1999), who tolerated the Ikhwan as a loyal opposition. Indeed the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hashemite monarchy predates even the reign of King Hussein. Most strikingly, Islamist activism in Jordanian politics has for more than 60 years emphasized reform, moderation, and democratic participation, rather than revolution, radicalism, and militancy. Yet in November of 2005, militant Islamists affiliated with al-Qa’ida in Iraq carried out a series of deadly bombings in the capital, Amman. Within hours, Jordan’s own Islamist movement had organized anti-al-Qa’ida demonstrations, condemning al-Qa’ida and militant Islamist terrorism. In doing so, Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists demonstrated the sharp–but too often underemphasized–difference between reformist and revolutionary approaches to Islamist activism.
This article examines the rise of the Islamist movement in Jordan, with emphasis on the longstanding relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hashemite monarchy. It then moves on to study the move toward political liberalization in the latter years of King Hussein’s reign and the corresponding shift within the Islamist movement toward legalized political party activism and electoral participation. Yet while Jordan’s Islamist movement has, therefore, been overwhelmingly reformist rather than revolutionary, and democratically-minded rather than militant, there nonetheless remain alternative Islamist forces that focus on jihadi ideas. The article therefore also examines the rise of the Salafiyya movement in the kingdom as well as the impact of foreign (including al-Qa’ida) jihadists in militant confrontations with the Jordanian state and society. Finally, the article discusses the implications of the Hashemite regime’s increasing emphasis on state security at the expense of political liberalization, and potentially at the expense of moderate forms of Islamism.
THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN HASHEMITE JORDAN
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 in Egypt by the Islamist activist Hasan al-Banna. The organization quickly developed branches throughout the Arab world, calling for a reassertion of Islam into public life in both government and society. While the Muslim Brotherhood established a presence in almost every Arab country, the individual organizations remained mainly autonomous, responding to local and national circumstances. In the case of Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood was established officially in the kingdom in 1945. From the very beginning, the Brotherhood made clear that its agenda was Islamist but not militant, and this drew the recognition of the state itself. In 1946, King Abdallah I officially recognized the Muslim Brotherhood as a charitable society in Jordan, and the king actually presided over the ceremony himself. Abdallah even included Muslim Brotherhood Secretary Abd al-Hakim al-Din in his governing cabinet, making this early linkage between the Brotherhood and the Hashemites institutionally clear.[1]
From the outset, the Muslim Brotherhood established a pattern of loyal opposition to the Hashemite regime. By emphasizing reform rather than revolution, the Brotherhood saw itself in partnership with the Jordanian state. As the regime consolidated its rule within Jordan, its moderate political positions, pro-Western foreign policy, and conservative monarchical institutions immediately served as a target for emerging Cold War ideological rifts, as well as emerging regional nationalist and revolutionary tensions. Thus from the perspective of the ruling regime, this de facto, if not de jure, relationship between the monarchy and its Islamist loyal opposition was intended in part to provide a counter to left-leaning secular oppositional trends ranging from Ba’thism to Nasserism to Communism.
While the regime attempted to curb leftist, secular, and pan-Arabist political tendencies, the monarchy simultaneously permitted its Islamist opposition to flourish. This allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to become by far the best organized group in the Jordanian opposition.[2] In doing so, the moderation of the Muslim Brotherhood also acted as a counter to more radical trends within Islamism, such as the Hizb al-Tahrir (Liberation Party) that had espoused a more revolutionary brand of Islamism, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s.[3] In an effort to enhance its own Islamic credentials, the Hashemite regime continuously emphasized the direct lineage of the royal family from that of Muhammad. The Brotherhood too has at times emphasized this level of Islamic legitimacy, in contrast to the many secular, leftist, or nationalist regimes that emerged in the Arab world in neighboring Egypt, Iraq, and Syria.
Beyond more direct political or governmental activism, however, the Muslim Brotherhood has taken very seriously its role as a charitable organization. With regime approval, the Brotherhood established the Islamic Center Charity Society in 1963, and was able to tap into funding generated from the oil economies of the wealthy and socially conservative Arab Gulf monarchies. For several decades now, the Brotherhood has presided over a range of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Indeed, the only organization that patronizes and sponsors more social and charitable organizations is the Hashemite royal family itself. The Brotherhood, meanwhile, established across the country an array of schools and health clinics, including the Islamic Hospital in central Amman.[4]
While it is clear that relations between the Hashemites and the Brotherhood are almost as old as the Jordanian state itself, this does not mean that the two sides have always agreed. The Muslim Brotherhood did indeed support the monarchy through its wars with Israel, its foiling of various nationalist coup attempts, and even the Jordanian civil war between the Hashemite army and the guerrilla forces of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1970-1971. The Brotherhood walked a slightly finer line during the various political upheavals triggered by International Monetary Fund (IMF) economic austerity programs, such as the "bread riots" of 1989 and 1996.[5]
Yet at other times the Brotherhood has directly opposed Hashemite policies, even while maintaining its de facto status as loyal opposition. The Brotherhood adamantly opposed Anwar Sadat’s separate peace treaty with Israel, for example, and viewed the Hashemite regime as too mild in its own opposition to Sadat’s move. When King Hussein resolutely stood by the shah of Iran in 1979 even as the Iranian Islamic Revolution swept the monarchy away, the Brotherhood again objected to the official Jordanian stance. This rift actually deepened following the 1980 Iraqi invasion of Iran, as Jordan supported Saddam Hussein’s Ba’thist Iraq in its war with the Iranian revolutionary regime. For Hussein, the prospect of an Islamist movement successfully toppling a conservative pro-Western monarch was positively chilling. Yet for the brotherhood, opposing the only successful Islamist regime in the region was unconscionable.
In more contemporary politics, the major policy rift between the Islamist movement and the Hashemite state has centered on Jordan’s own peace treaty with Israel signed in 1994. The Islamist movement adamantly opposed the treaty at the time, and in the years afterward its opposition only grew. The Brotherhood became a leading part of the broader "anti-normalization" movement in Jordan; if the opposition could not prevent the treaty, it could and did manage largely to prevent normalization of society-to-society relations. Since Islamists had tended to win democratic elections for the leadership positions within most of Jordan’s professional associations (for doctors, engineers, lawyers, and pharmacists, for example), the Islamist movement was institutionally positioned to maintain its self-declared ban on working with Israeli counterparts.[6]
THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT, LIBERALIZATION, AND ELECTIONS
Jordan’s program of political liberalization began in earnest in 1989, as a direct response to widespread political unrest in the kingdom. An International Monetary Fund (IMF) economic austerity program, imposed in an attempt to improve the kingdom’s declining economy, had triggered rioting throughout the country. The depth and breadth of the political upheaval had clearly shaken the regime itself, which responded with what amounted to "defensive democratization."[7] King Hussein fired the unpopular Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa’i, shuffled the governing cabinet, and announced the return of elections for parliament for the first time since martial law had been declared in the wake of the 1967 War with Israel. Jordan’s political liberalization thereafter included several rounds of democratic parliamentary elections (1989, 1993, 1997, 2003, and 2007), the lifting of martial law (1991), legalization of political parties (1992), and several rounds of revisions regarding government control of media, press, and publications.[8] Given its longstanding relationship with the regime, and its status as virtually the only officially tolerated form of opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood was perfectly positioned to benefit from the new atmosphere of openness. As parliamentary and electoral life returned to the kingdom, the Brotherhood was able to capitalize on decades-worth of organization.
Yet beyond the Brotherhood, Jordan also has a long tradition of independent Islamist activism in addition to that of organized groups such as the Ikhwan, or their contemporary political party: the IAF. Independent Islamists have tended to resist joining organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood, or parties like the IAF, which they often accuse of being co-opted by the regime. Among the most well-known independent Islamist activists is the outspoken Layth Shubaylat, who was among those independents serving in the 1989-1993 parliament. Shubaylat has argued that "institutional" Islamism is effectively a tool of the regime, which thereby has managed to "tame" the Muslim Brotherhood.[9]
Shubaylat’s strident criticism of the regime and its policies led to his arrest in 1992. In what amounts to a familiar pattern of curbing dissent in the Hashemite kingdom, Shubaylat was arrested, tried, convicted, and soon thereafter pardoned by the king. While this is nowhere near the level of ruthlessness one finds in other regional regimes, the message and latent threat to the opposition more generally is nonetheless clear. Having a criminal conviction also bars an individual from running for office in the future, and the regime therefore managed to remove Shubaylat from parliamentary opposition permanently.
Unlike Shubaylat and other critics, the Muslim Brotherhood intended not only to compete in the elections, but also hoped ultimately to gain positions in government and reform state policy. In the 1989 elections, to the surprise of many in the Hashemite regime, the Muslim Brotherhood secured 22 parliamentary seats (out of a total of 80), while independent Islamists won an additional 12 seats. With a bloc of 34 seats in parliament, the Jordanian Islamist movement elected one of its most influential leaders, Dr. Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat, to be speaker of the house. For Arabiyyat, the events of 1989 served as a "wake-up call" for the Hashemite regime.[10] Prime Minister Mudar Badran, responding to the Islamist electoral victories, invited several Islamists into his government. This, however, led to a rift within the movement regarding a very important proposition: Should Islamists serve in the government at all?
Hardline members of the Islamist movement argued that this amounted to a kind of capitulation to the state, and in effect a contamination of the movement itself. Many left the Brotherhood over this issue, becoming part of Jordan’s longstanding traditional of independent Islamist thought and activism. Yet the more mainstream members of the Ikhwan saw serving as cabinet ministers as a well-deserved reward for years of organizational effort. Among this latter group were Abdallah Akaylah (minister of education), Yusuf al-Azm (minister of social development), Majid al-Khalifa (minister of justice), Zayd al-Kilani (minister of awqaf and religious affairs), and Adnan al-Jaljuli (minister of health).[11]
With five cabinet portfolios and leading a bloc of 34 parliamentary seats, the Muslim Brotherhood had accomplished an astounding political victory. This was tempered rather quickly, however, when public opinion turned against many of the measures that the Islamist ministers imposed. The most notorious of these included a failed attempt to ban alcohol in the kingdom, sexual segregation in some governmental office buildings, and a ban (later rescinded) on fathers watching their daughters in competitive sports. It is important to note, here, that this too played into the state’s strategy. While the Hashemite regime had no way of knowing what specific policies would be implemented, regime officials were certain that the Islamist ministers–if given room to maneuver–would in fact rile public opinion against their various measures. The idea, in short, was to ease tensions by including the opposition in government, but also to allow them to fall flat in the face of a backlash in public opinion.[12]
In any event, the government itself was dissolved merely six months later, and replaced with an equally short-lived cabinet led by new Prime Minister Tahir al-Masri, a more liberal and progressive politician. This time, the Brotherhood rejected the few token ministries it was offered and instead worked to oust the Masri government in a no confidence vote. While the vote never carried, Masri’s position had become quickly unworkable, and once again the government was replaced.[13]
The regime clearly remained alarmed at the level of Islamist influence and electoral success, however, and government efforts thereafter turned on limiting Islamist successes in future elections. The regime therefore responded to the Islamist victories with a sweeping change of the electoral system: changing to a one-person one-vote structure with modified electoral districts. While the earlier system, which allowed Jordanians to vote for multiple MP’s (depending on how many would represent the given district) had perhaps exaggerated Islamist strength, the new system was designed to do precisely the reverse. In the 1993 elections, which followed the legalization of political parties in the kingdom, the Muslim Brotherhood did not directly participate, returning instead to its traditional role as political, social, and charitable movement. Instead, many Ikhwan members, and even Islamists outside the Brotherhood, formed and joined the IAF.[14] The IAF over time became, in effect, the political party wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. As such, the IAF participated in the 1993 elections, but secured only 16 parliamentary seats, while independent Islamists dropped to a mere six seats. However, this drop off in representation appeared to be due more to the changed electoral law, rather than to a backlash against Islamist government policies.[15]
Following the drop in electoral strength in the 1993 elections, the Islamist movement demanded a repeal of the newer electoral system. They correctly argued that the districts themselves were unbalanced: over-representing more conservative, pro-regime rural areas, and under-representing more urban–and more Palestinian–areas that had provided key bases of support for Jordanian Islamism. When the government refused to comply with Islamist demands to change the electoral system, the IAF led a broad-based opposition coalition (including leftist and pan-Arab nationalist parties) in an 11-party boycott of the 1997 elections. The resulting parliament naturally proved to be overwhelmingly conservative, nationalist, and pro-Hashemite.[16] With only six independent Islamist MP’s in the new parliament, and no MP’s whatsoever from the IAF, Islamist strength and strategy shifted from parties and parliament, toward the professional associations instead. In short order, Islamist candidates won the leadership posts of almost every professional association in the kingdom (e.g. engineers, pharmacists, medical doctors), thereby creating a basis for Islamist political activism outside the halls of parliament, but very much within Jordanian civil society.[17]
KING ABDALLAH II AND THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT
In 1999, King Hussein of Jordan died after a long battle with cancer. He was succeeded by his eldest son, Abdallah, who became King Abdallah II. While the succession itself had proceeded smoothly and peacefully, the same could not be said for regional politics and hence Jordan’s immediate political environment. With the emergence of the second Palestinian uprising–or intifada–in 2000 and preparations looming for a second U.S. war on Iraq, the new Jordanian regime decided to put off part of the political liberalization process, by postponing parliamentary elections scheduled for November 2001.
Yet in 2003, after two years of postponements, Jordan held its fourth round of parliamentary elections since the start of the liberalization process in 1989. The 2003 elections were the first under King Abdallah II, and marked the return of the opposition to electoral politics. This time the IAF and the opposition parties eschewed the boycott tactics of 1997 and instead contested the elections, which were held under a new set of laws extending the number of parliamentary seats from 80 to 110, including a minimum of six seats to guarantee women’s representation in parliament. Seventeen IAF members gained parliamentary seats. Interestingly, the IAF parliamentary deputies included Hayat al-Musani, the first woman elected to parliament under the quota system. In addition to the IAF bloc, five independent Islamists were also elected to parliament.[18]
While the IAF remained focused on its own Islamist political agenda, most legislation continued to emerge from the government itself, with the parliament serving as a debating forum that usually provided a legislative stamp of approval for government initiatives. The IAF had no success in achieving its broadest policy goals. These unfulfilled goals included implementing Shari’a (Islamic law) and abrogating the Jordan-Israel peace treaty.
Still, the IAF did align itself with more secular conservative forces to block repeated government attempts to change Jordan’s laws regarding "honor crimes;" that is, crimes purportedly linked to family honor in which men kill female relatives who are believed to have in some way shamed the family. Jordan’s monarchy itself has endorsed attempts to change the kingdom’s otherwise lenient pattern of sentencing for these crimes. Yet the Islamist movement, in temporary alliances with other social conservatives in parliament, has consistently opposed attempts to change the legal system regarding "crimes of honor."[19]
Salafists, Jihadists, and "Jordan’s 9-11"
While the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF are the best organized, most recognizable faces of Islamism in Jordan, there also remain more subtle and even underground forms. Jordan’s Salafiyya movement, for example, has grown steadily since the 1980s. The term "Salafi" refers to the earliest Muslim communities and specifically the immediate companions of Muhammad. The Salafiyya movement, in fact, originally emerged from the reformist efforts of Islamic Modernist thinker Jamal al-Din al-Afghani in the nineteenth century. Yet in the late twentieth century the term Salafiyya has changed dramatically and perhaps even reversed the earlier emphasis on modernism and reform. Salafism today, in contrast, usually refers to a more hardline and puritanical approach to Islamic revivalism. Some versions of Salafism (although not all) have turned instead toward militancy, terrorism, and jihadi activism.
In the Jordanian case, as in many other countries, the rise in Salafi activity coincided with the end of the Afghani mujahidin war against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. This is, in short, a much more recent phenomenon than the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood. Many credit the rise of a Salafi alternative (to both the Jordanian state and its more established Islamist opposition) to the arrival in Jordan of the influential Salafi Shaykh Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Bani. Shaykh al-Bani fled to the kingdom from Syria in 1979, as the Ba’thist state was deepening its crackdown on Sunni Islamists in Syria. In the words of Quintan Wiktorowicz, the arrival of al-Bani "precipitated an explosion of Salafi activism" as he essentially served as a "focal point" for Islamists seeking a return to what they viewed as a more authentic and traditional approach to Islam.[20]
Still, while the Salafi alternative has increased in strength in Jordan over time, it also remains of at least two minds. Some Salafists believe that radical change is needed in Jordan, but they do not necessarily believe that jihad is either viable or appropriate. For others, jihad is the only alternative. Not surprisingly these latter Salafists include many returned veterans of the Afghan wars. The jihadi tendency within the Jordanian Salafi movement sees itself as takfiri; that is, those who declare the Hashemite state as kafir–unbelievers against whom jihad is no less than a duty. These Salafi jihadists are influenced not only by Shaykh al-Bani, but also by the earlier writings of thirteenth century Islamist Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya and twentieth century Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb.[21]
Wiktorowicz has argued that while the Muslim Brotherhood and IAF rely on formal organization and participation in political parties, professional associations, and charities, the Salafi movement has instead relied on informal networks for recruitment and activism. He further argues that many of Jordan’s religious scholars, the ulama, are themselves Salafists. The informal networks, meanwhile, allow Salafists to at least attempt to continue their activism under the radar of state surveillance.[22] Still, despite the rise in Salafiyya ideas and activity, most of Jordan’s Islamist movement remains more mainstream, reformist, and democratic, while the major terrorist threats have come largely from foreign al-Qa’ida militants.
The worst terrorist attack in Jordan occurred in November 2005, as noted at the outset of this article, as al-Qa’ida suicide bombers struck three luxury hotels in central Amman, killing 60 people–mostly Jordanians–and injuring more than 100. The IAF and the Muslim Brotherhood were among the first to respond to the tragedy by organizing anti-al-Qa’ida demonstrations in the capital. The demonstrations underscored the difference between moderate mainstream pro-democratic forms of Islamism (such as Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood) and militant global jihadi organizations (such as al-Qa’ida). The terrorists struck on the 9 November 2005–hence, it was literally "Jordan’s 9-11"–and all were ethnic Iraqis sent to Jordan merely days earlier on the orders of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi. Zarqawi, formerly a Jordanian national, had become the self-styled leader of al-Qa’ida in Iraq. The attack, it seems, was meant to punish Jordan for its closeness to the United States, among other grievances against the Hashemites.[23]
Jordanian intelligence services had claimed to have previously foiled no less than 150 other plots to public safety and security from militant Islamists affiliated with al-Qa’ida. Yet all earlier plots had involved Jordanian nationals, while the November 2005 bombings were carried out by Iraqi suicide bombers. These militants, unfortunately, managed to slip through the network of security and intelligence to carry out their attacks. Al-Qa’ida militants had, however, earlier struck on a more limited scale, including firing Katyusha rockets in Jordan’s port city of Aqaba, killing one Jordanian soldier.[24]
The scale and barbarity of the Amman bombings, each of which targeted a wedding party taking place in a major (Western) hotel chain in central Amman, seemed to transform Jordanian public opinion regarding Islamist militancy and terrorism. In a poll conducted by the University of Jordan’s Center for Strategic Studies, responses to the same questions varied greatly between 2004 and December 2005–one month after the attacks. In the 2004 survey, 68 percent of Jordanians polled viewed al-Qa’ida as a "legitimate resistance organization." In 2005, that number had declined to 20 percent. Similarly, in 2004, only 10.6 percent labeled al-Qa’ida as a terrorist organization, while in 2005 that number had increased to 48.9 percent. When the pollsters added a distinction, and asked specifically about the Zarqawi-led organization within al-Qa’ida, 72.2 percent of Jordanians saw it as a terrorist organization rather than a legitimate resistance organization.[25]
Despite the hostility of most Jordanians, including Islamists, to the terrorist attacks, the Islamist movement in parliament nonetheless soon found itself squaring off with the government following a major cabinet reshuffle. The new government made clear that the monarchy had shifted entirely to security-mode. King Abdallah dismissed the more moderate Prime Minister Adnan Badran, and replaced him with Ma’ruf Bakhit, Jordan’s former ambassador to Israel and very much a security hawk. Conservative royalists retained the speakership posts in both the lower house of parliament (under Abd al-Hadi al-Majali) as well as the upper house or senate (under former prime minister Zayd al-Rifa’i). Neither man was known for his sympathies for Islamists, or for Palestinians for that matter.
Aware that security concerns had provided the pretext for a host of earlier deliberalization moves over the years, Islamist members of parliament urged the regime not to use the tragedy of the bombings as an excuse to issue new martial laws. The government, for its part, declared that counterterrorism would be a key policy focus and it called for "preemptive war" specifically on militant forms of Islamism. Although Muslim Brotherhood and IAF were not in any way militant, they nonetheless feared that new security measures might be used against them. In January 2006, seemingly on cue, the government issued charges against one of the IAF’s leaders, Jamil Abu Bakr, for "harming the dignity of the state." The charges stemmed from articles on the IAF website that criticized the government tendency to appoint officials due mainly to connections (wasta) rather than expertise or parliamentary consultations. The charges were dropped the following month, but the sense of harassment remained. The regime meanwhile moved still further in its efforts to rein in more militant Islamism, including issuing a new law restricting preaching in mosques and issuing fatwas only to government-approved ulama. Finally, perhaps the most ominous sign was the new and decidedly elastic anti-terrorism law that seemed to greatly expand the roles, powers, and influence of the intelligence and police services in daily life.[26]
The Hamas Factor in Jordanian Politics?
With the sweeping victory of Hamas in Palestinian legislative elections in January 2006, a "Hamas factor" appeared to have reinvigorated Jordan’s already well-organized and well-established Islamist movement. With its emphasis on anti-corruption in its political campaign, as well as its maintenance of charities, clinics, and schools, Hamas was in many ways adopting the electoral strategies and tactics of Jordan’s IAF and Muslim Brotherhood. Yet unlike Hamas, the IAF and Muslim Brotherhood do not have a militant wing, and instead focus on civilian party and interest group organization and remain very much a part of the pro-democratization movement in the kingdom. Hamas representatives were expelled from Jordan in 1999, when the kingdom severed ties and closed their offices.
Now, however, with the Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections, the IAF called on the Jordanian government to restore ties and recognize their achievement. Jordan’s Islamists were also inspired by the relative success of Muslim Brotherhood candidates (running as independents) in Egyptian parliamentary elections as well as the rise of Islamist activists to power in neighboring Iraq. Jordanian Islamists, like their counterparts elsewhere, campaigned on platforms of clean government and inclusion, and their credibility in this area benefited from their already-established reputation for civic mindedness, based on the extensive Muslim Brotherhood network of charitable organizations.[27]
In the midst of this Islamist euphoria over the inspiring electoral successes of others, however, the IAF and Muslim Brotherhood did nothing to endear themselves to an already suspicious Hashemite regime, when Islamist activists chose to attend the Arab political parties conference held in Damascus in March 2006. Syrian President Bashar al-Asad hosted the conference on behalf of Syria’s Ba’thist regime. Thus Jordanian Islamists attended an event that banned Islamists from Syria itself. The point was not lost on Syria’s exiled Muslim Brotherhood, which lambasted the IAF for its lack of solidarity and questionable judgment.
The IAF meanwhile found itself also attacked by the Jordanian government, when President Asad mockingly referred to the Hashemite regime’s "Jordan First" policy. Asad coupled "Jordan First" with Lebanon’s recently unveiled "Lebanon First" agenda, suggesting that such narrow visions meant that surely the United States or Israel lurked as a close second. While the Jordanian press castigated the Syrian regime for arrogance and a long list of other complaints, the Hashemite regime remained angered that the Jordanians present at the speech had either failed to refute Asad’s comments, or worse, had actually applauded.[28]
For many Islamists, the Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections was inspiring, but it was also a reminder of their comparative limitations. Hamas’ electoral win translated immediately into a new Hamas-led government and cabinet. Within Jordan, in contrast, almost two decades of Islamist electoral strategies had indeed translated to some success, but to no chance whatsoever to form an IAF government in Jordan. After the Hamas victory, however, a new boldness entered the rhetoric of some IAF leaders, who now announced their new political program. Some aspects remain cornerstones of earlier programs: fully implementing Shari’a law, abandoning the Wadi Araba treaty, ending normalization with Israel.[29] Yet others included demands to stop attempting to "downsize" the Islamist movement through electoral laws designed to minimize their representation. Azzam al-Hunaydi, the leader of the IAF bloc within parliament, minced no words when he stated flatly that "that which faces the Islamic movement–in terms of attempts at marginalization and exclusion, tailoring of laws and the policy of ceilings–will not last indefinitely." He may have caught the attention of Jordan’s security-focused regime when he added even more starkly that "the time of downsizing, marginalization, showing scorn for people and being captive to foreigners will end soon."[30]
In the view of Hunaydi and many other Islamist activists, Jordan remained committed to the wrong paths in both domestic and foreign policy. The IAF therefore presented itself as an alternative approach, and one that was ready to govern. The "Hamas effect," in short, had provided the Jordanian Islamist movement with a renewed optimism.[31] IAF deputies charged that in freer and fairer elections, they might win 40 to 50 percent of the vote. With Islamists rising to prominence and power through nearby elections–Hizballah in Lebanon, various Islamist Shi’a parties in Iraq, and Hamas in the Palestinian territories–Jordanian Islamists argued that they might now be poised to win an outright majority in parliament. Given Jordan’s heavily gerrymandered electoral districts, which favor rural over urban districts (and hence under-represent predominantly Palestinian and Islamist areas of the kingdom), the IAF optimism may be unfounded. Even aside from gerrymandered districts, the party has never received close to half the overall votes. Yet under a new and more even-handed electoral law, they would nonetheless be likely to do fairly well. Indeed, IAF and Muslim Brotherhood officials made very clear their overall view of the current system, when they repeatedly called on the regime to issue a new "democratic elections law" (emphasis added).[32]
In addition to concerns about the electoral system, Jordanian Islamists also insisted that governments should then be drawn from parliament in a truer model of a parliamentary system, rather than royally-appointed pending only the formality of parliamentary approval. IAF deputies remained certain that their "street" support greatly exceeded their actual parliamentary power. In the wrangling within Jordanian politics over the next and "final" law on parties and elections, the IAF insisted that hinted bans on religiously-based parties remain off the table, while a more truly democratic election law remains very much an IAF interest, so that the alleged Islamist street majority could one day become a governing coalition.
This issue of linking elections to actual governance was a key sticking point in the struggle between the government and its opposition, when they bargained over the ground rules for the next rounds of parliamentary elections. Yet in effect, the government and its opponents were also debating the future nature of the Jordanian state itself.
Islamists and the 2007 Jordanian Elections
The November 2007 national parliamentary elections followed an earlier round of municipal elections, held throughout the kingdom in July 2007. If that earlier set of elections was viewed as a harbinger of things to come, its conclusion did not encourage the Islamists. Amidst widespread charges of vote-rigging, the IAF announced its withdrawal from the process, but only on election day itself. The government quickly argued that the Islamists were merely attempting to save face in the midst of a resounding electoral defeat, while the Islamist movement, in contrast, insisted that the regime was engaged in an elaborate process of vote-rigging. Both sides may have had a point. At issue was the practice of busing soldiers to polling places, who would then vote in very large numbers, presumably tipping the scales to pro-government candidates even in Islamist strongholds like Irbid and Zarqa. The Islamists therefore felt that they were being systematically under-represented, and that this was part of a broader process to sideline them in Jordanian politics and society. Indeed, the year before, in 2006, the regime had even dissolved the Muslim Brotherhood’s main means of distributing its social welfare programs and funds: the Islamic Center Charity.[33]
It was therefore in an atmosphere of increasing wariness, and even mutual hostility between the state and the Islamist movement, that the national election campaign began. This tense context only exacerbated divisions within the Islamist movement itself, particularly between hawks and doves, regarding tactics and strategy, if not policy. The dovish and moderate wing of the movement, which had for so long maintained a level of understanding with the Hashemite state, even negotiated with the government in an attempt to allay the regime’s fears of the hawks. Indeed, Jordan’s intelligence services seemed to view the hawkish wing, led by IAF Secretary General Zaki Bani-Irshayd, as increasingly a de facto Jordanian Hamas-style movement operating within the broader Islamist framework.[34]
The moderate wing agreed to field a mere 22 candidates (down from the usual 30 or so) in the national elections and even ensured that most of these would be from the dovish wings of the IAF and Muslim Brotherhood. Having secured 17 seats in the previous parliament, the Islamist movement expected to retain its earlier strength at minimum. Yet when the votes were counted, Islamist representation (out of a parliament of 110) had plummeted to only six seats. More surprisingly, no Islamist candidates were elected in key political bases such as Irbid and Zarqa.[35] Once again, the recriminations flowed swiftly.
The IAF and Muslim Brotherhood leaders each accused the government of fraud and vote-rigging. Specifically, they argued that vote-buying schemes were widespread, with the government allegedly ignoring widespread irregularities.[36] The recriminations did not stop there, however, but resurfaced within the Islamist movement itself. Hawks such as Bani-Irshayd, who had been so skeptical of the process in the first place, accused moderates of losing the elections for the Islamist movement. The attempt of the moderates to work with the regime appeared to have back-fired. In his analysis of state survival strategies in Jordan, Asher Susser has argued that the 2007 election outcome was the result, in effect, of the more hawkish Islamist elements greatly overplaying their hand, combined with a pronounced sharp reaction of a state that was in a defensive and even "punitive" mood. "The attempt by the doves in the movement to come to an understanding with the government at the last minute was essentially rebuffed," Susser argues, "The hawks had crossed a line, and the Islamists as a whole were going to be taught a lesson."[37]
For both sides the immediate regional context was critical. Islamist successes in elections in Gaza, the West Bank, Egypt, Lebanon, and even Turkey seemed to prompt the Jordanian IAF to push for far more than the Jordanian Islamist movement had heretofore achieved, or been allowed to achieve. While the Hashemite regime, in contrast, felt hard-pressed to contain what they viewed as a Hamas-like shift within Jordanian Islamism. Jordanian analyst Hasan Barari, while acknowledging the probability of state electioneering, has also argued that the major factor may have been a shift in Jordanian public opinion itself, especially in the wake of the 2005 Amman bombings.[38] Despite the moderation and reformism of most of Jordan’s Islamist movement, there may have been some level of public backlash and impatience with Islamists in general.
The main victims of the elections, however, may have been–not simply Islamists–but moderate Islamists. The government’s strategy appeared to be shifting beyond containment of Islamism in the kingdom, and towards a more active and even aggressive strategy of disrupting the movement, and deepening intra-Islamist divisions. The question, of course, is whether this electoral disaster for the Islamist movement leads it, ultimately, to itself pursue its traditional loyal opposition strategy, or shift to a more radical and more confrontational approach to the Hashemite state.
CONCLUSIONS
For more than 60 years, the Hashemite monarchy and its mainstream Islamist movement have maintained a cooperative relationship. In recent years, however, a pattern of deliberalization threatened to erode that long pattern of Islamist loyal opposition to the monarchy and the state. The monarchy saw these measures as necessary, given the extreme and even violent circumstances in the region. Jordan remained wedged between violence in neighboring states: that is, between a Palestinian uprising and Israeli military responses, to the west, while to the east, Iraq was mired in war, occupation, insurgency, and civil strife.
After the 2005 al-Qa’ida bombings in the capital itself, the regime’s already-established security emphases simply became that much stronger. Yet the danger remained that the regime’s security concerns were effectively undermining Jordan’s once-heralded process of political liberalization and democratization. The regime’s tolerance for Islamist dissent, for example, was limited indeed. When several IAF members of parliament paid a condolence call to the family of the late Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi (killed in Iraq in 2006), they were soon arrested and tried with crimes against the state. The arrested MP’s included Ali Abu Sukkar, Ja’far Hurani, and Muhammad Abu Faris. Abu Faris angered the regime still further (and indeed infuriated Jordanian public opinion as well) when, in an interview with the satellite television station al-Arabiyya, he stated that Zarqawi was a martyr, but that the victims of the Amman bombings were not.[39] The three deputies were convicted of inciting terrorism, but in a very familiar pattern of reining in dissent in Hashemite Jordan, they were later pardoned and released.
Many Islamists read this episode as merely a small part of an overall campaign against them. Moreover, while Abu Faris is indeed more radical than most Islamists active in Jordanian public life, the regime’s general pattern of actions seemed to be directed not simply toward individuals, but rather against the IAF and the Muslim Brotherhood more broadly. While the regime would reject this interpretation, many in Jordan’s mainstream Islamist movement would not. The Islamist movement itself, in the meantime, remained divided and indeed strained by the fallout and recriminations from the disastrous 2007 parliamentary elections.
Even as the hawks attempted to sideline moderates, calling for their resignations and blaming them for the loss, the moderate leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood managed to respond firmly. In April 2008, the internal party court within the Brotherhood officially suspended radicals Zaki Bani-Irshayd and Muhammad Abu Faris for one year from membership in the powerful Shura council that runs the organization. [40] Yet Bani-Irshayd retained his position as secretary general of the IAF, while the hardline Hammam al-Sa’id was elected to be the new general guide of the Muslim Brotherhood. Just as importantly, however, the moderates reaffirmed their position by securing half of the seats on the Brotherhood’s ruling Shura council and by electing moderate leader Abd al-Latif al-Arabiyyat as head of the council itself. The Shura council, therefore, continues to reflect the divisions within the Islamist movement itself The IAF, for its part, had to scramble to make the deadline to comply with a new political parties law in the kingdom. While Jordanian Islamists objected to the newer and more restrictive approach to political parties, the IAF did manage in April 2008 to renew its license and hence retain its legal status in Jordan. As the discussion above makes clear, however, the debates over tactics, strategy, and the role of Islamism in Jordanian politics nonetheless continued, both within the Islamist movement and within the Hashemite regime itself.
Jordanian government officials often argue that any restrictive measures are actually quite moderate (when compared to most other states in the Middle East) and that they are simply prudent given the extreme circumstances in the region.[41] In contrast, many in the Islamist movement feel that the longstanding cooperation between reformist Islamism and the monarchy may be in decline. These vastly different interpretations are a key issue for the future of Jordanian politics, as they will in turn affect the policies and tactics of both government and opposition in Jordan. There is, in short, a danger here that the regime’s various deliberalization moves in recent years (all made in the name of national security) may ultimately serve to alienate the moderates who make up the overwhelming majority of Jordan’s Islamist activists, unwittingly empowering the heretofore smaller but more militant alternatives.
*Curtis R. Ryan is an associate professor of political science at Appalachian State University, North Carolina. He holds a B.A. from Drew University and an M.A. and a Ph.D. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He served as a Fulbright Scholar at the Center for Strategic Studies in Jordan (1992-1993) and was twice named a Peace Scholar by the United States Institute of Peace. He is the author of Jordan in Transition: From Hussein to Abdullah (Lynne Rienner, 2002) as well as articles published in the Middle East Journal, Middle East Insight, Arab Studies Quarterly, Israel Affairs, Southeastern Political Review, Journal of Third World Studies, Middle East Policy, and Middle East Report. His new book is on Inter-Arab Alliances (forthcoming in 2008, University Press of Florida).
Source
By Curtis C. Ryan
While democracy has proven to be a fragile and elusive form of politics in the modern Arab world, Islamist movements have flourished–ranging from grass-roots pro-democracy activism to militant jihadism and terrorism. Whether Arab politics witnesses more political liberalization in the near future will depend in large part on the nature of Islamist movements, as well as ruling regimes’ reactions to them. This article examines the broad range of Islamist alternatives within one of the more liberalizing Arab states–the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan–with a view to understanding the depth and breadth of Islamist forms of political mobilization.
The Islamist movement in Jordan has a history and heritage as old as that of the Hashemite regime itself. While Jordan’s main Islamist political party–the Islamic Action Front (Jabha al-Amal al-Islami or IAF)–was not legalized until the early 1990s, Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) maintained a functional relationship with the Hashemite monarchy especially throughout the reign of King Hussein (1953-1999), who tolerated the Ikhwan as a loyal opposition. Indeed the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hashemite monarchy predates even the reign of King Hussein. Most strikingly, Islamist activism in Jordanian politics has for more than 60 years emphasized reform, moderation, and democratic participation, rather than revolution, radicalism, and militancy. Yet in November of 2005, militant Islamists affiliated with al-Qa’ida in Iraq carried out a series of deadly bombings in the capital, Amman. Within hours, Jordan’s own Islamist movement had organized anti-al-Qa’ida demonstrations, condemning al-Qa’ida and militant Islamist terrorism. In doing so, Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists demonstrated the sharp–but too often underemphasized–difference between reformist and revolutionary approaches to Islamist activism.
This article examines the rise of the Islamist movement in Jordan, with emphasis on the longstanding relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hashemite monarchy. It then moves on to study the move toward political liberalization in the latter years of King Hussein’s reign and the corresponding shift within the Islamist movement toward legalized political party activism and electoral participation. Yet while Jordan’s Islamist movement has, therefore, been overwhelmingly reformist rather than revolutionary, and democratically-minded rather than militant, there nonetheless remain alternative Islamist forces that focus on jihadi ideas. The article therefore also examines the rise of the Salafiyya movement in the kingdom as well as the impact of foreign (including al-Qa’ida) jihadists in militant confrontations with the Jordanian state and society. Finally, the article discusses the implications of the Hashemite regime’s increasing emphasis on state security at the expense of political liberalization, and potentially at the expense of moderate forms of Islamism.
THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN HASHEMITE JORDAN
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 in Egypt by the Islamist activist Hasan al-Banna. The organization quickly developed branches throughout the Arab world, calling for a reassertion of Islam into public life in both government and society. While the Muslim Brotherhood established a presence in almost every Arab country, the individual organizations remained mainly autonomous, responding to local and national circumstances. In the case of Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood was established officially in the kingdom in 1945. From the very beginning, the Brotherhood made clear that its agenda was Islamist but not militant, and this drew the recognition of the state itself. In 1946, King Abdallah I officially recognized the Muslim Brotherhood as a charitable society in Jordan, and the king actually presided over the ceremony himself. Abdallah even included Muslim Brotherhood Secretary Abd al-Hakim al-Din in his governing cabinet, making this early linkage between the Brotherhood and the Hashemites institutionally clear.[1]
From the outset, the Muslim Brotherhood established a pattern of loyal opposition to the Hashemite regime. By emphasizing reform rather than revolution, the Brotherhood saw itself in partnership with the Jordanian state. As the regime consolidated its rule within Jordan, its moderate political positions, pro-Western foreign policy, and conservative monarchical institutions immediately served as a target for emerging Cold War ideological rifts, as well as emerging regional nationalist and revolutionary tensions. Thus from the perspective of the ruling regime, this de facto, if not de jure, relationship between the monarchy and its Islamist loyal opposition was intended in part to provide a counter to left-leaning secular oppositional trends ranging from Ba’thism to Nasserism to Communism.
While the regime attempted to curb leftist, secular, and pan-Arabist political tendencies, the monarchy simultaneously permitted its Islamist opposition to flourish. This allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to become by far the best organized group in the Jordanian opposition.[2] In doing so, the moderation of the Muslim Brotherhood also acted as a counter to more radical trends within Islamism, such as the Hizb al-Tahrir (Liberation Party) that had espoused a more revolutionary brand of Islamism, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s.[3] In an effort to enhance its own Islamic credentials, the Hashemite regime continuously emphasized the direct lineage of the royal family from that of Muhammad. The Brotherhood too has at times emphasized this level of Islamic legitimacy, in contrast to the many secular, leftist, or nationalist regimes that emerged in the Arab world in neighboring Egypt, Iraq, and Syria.
Beyond more direct political or governmental activism, however, the Muslim Brotherhood has taken very seriously its role as a charitable organization. With regime approval, the Brotherhood established the Islamic Center Charity Society in 1963, and was able to tap into funding generated from the oil economies of the wealthy and socially conservative Arab Gulf monarchies. For several decades now, the Brotherhood has presided over a range of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Indeed, the only organization that patronizes and sponsors more social and charitable organizations is the Hashemite royal family itself. The Brotherhood, meanwhile, established across the country an array of schools and health clinics, including the Islamic Hospital in central Amman.[4]
While it is clear that relations between the Hashemites and the Brotherhood are almost as old as the Jordanian state itself, this does not mean that the two sides have always agreed. The Muslim Brotherhood did indeed support the monarchy through its wars with Israel, its foiling of various nationalist coup attempts, and even the Jordanian civil war between the Hashemite army and the guerrilla forces of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1970-1971. The Brotherhood walked a slightly finer line during the various political upheavals triggered by International Monetary Fund (IMF) economic austerity programs, such as the "bread riots" of 1989 and 1996.[5]
Yet at other times the Brotherhood has directly opposed Hashemite policies, even while maintaining its de facto status as loyal opposition. The Brotherhood adamantly opposed Anwar Sadat’s separate peace treaty with Israel, for example, and viewed the Hashemite regime as too mild in its own opposition to Sadat’s move. When King Hussein resolutely stood by the shah of Iran in 1979 even as the Iranian Islamic Revolution swept the monarchy away, the Brotherhood again objected to the official Jordanian stance. This rift actually deepened following the 1980 Iraqi invasion of Iran, as Jordan supported Saddam Hussein’s Ba’thist Iraq in its war with the Iranian revolutionary regime. For Hussein, the prospect of an Islamist movement successfully toppling a conservative pro-Western monarch was positively chilling. Yet for the brotherhood, opposing the only successful Islamist regime in the region was unconscionable.
In more contemporary politics, the major policy rift between the Islamist movement and the Hashemite state has centered on Jordan’s own peace treaty with Israel signed in 1994. The Islamist movement adamantly opposed the treaty at the time, and in the years afterward its opposition only grew. The Brotherhood became a leading part of the broader "anti-normalization" movement in Jordan; if the opposition could not prevent the treaty, it could and did manage largely to prevent normalization of society-to-society relations. Since Islamists had tended to win democratic elections for the leadership positions within most of Jordan’s professional associations (for doctors, engineers, lawyers, and pharmacists, for example), the Islamist movement was institutionally positioned to maintain its self-declared ban on working with Israeli counterparts.[6]
THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT, LIBERALIZATION, AND ELECTIONS
Jordan’s program of political liberalization began in earnest in 1989, as a direct response to widespread political unrest in the kingdom. An International Monetary Fund (IMF) economic austerity program, imposed in an attempt to improve the kingdom’s declining economy, had triggered rioting throughout the country. The depth and breadth of the political upheaval had clearly shaken the regime itself, which responded with what amounted to "defensive democratization."[7] King Hussein fired the unpopular Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa’i, shuffled the governing cabinet, and announced the return of elections for parliament for the first time since martial law had been declared in the wake of the 1967 War with Israel. Jordan’s political liberalization thereafter included several rounds of democratic parliamentary elections (1989, 1993, 1997, 2003, and 2007), the lifting of martial law (1991), legalization of political parties (1992), and several rounds of revisions regarding government control of media, press, and publications.[8] Given its longstanding relationship with the regime, and its status as virtually the only officially tolerated form of opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood was perfectly positioned to benefit from the new atmosphere of openness. As parliamentary and electoral life returned to the kingdom, the Brotherhood was able to capitalize on decades-worth of organization.
Yet beyond the Brotherhood, Jordan also has a long tradition of independent Islamist activism in addition to that of organized groups such as the Ikhwan, or their contemporary political party: the IAF. Independent Islamists have tended to resist joining organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood, or parties like the IAF, which they often accuse of being co-opted by the regime. Among the most well-known independent Islamist activists is the outspoken Layth Shubaylat, who was among those independents serving in the 1989-1993 parliament. Shubaylat has argued that "institutional" Islamism is effectively a tool of the regime, which thereby has managed to "tame" the Muslim Brotherhood.[9]
Shubaylat’s strident criticism of the regime and its policies led to his arrest in 1992. In what amounts to a familiar pattern of curbing dissent in the Hashemite kingdom, Shubaylat was arrested, tried, convicted, and soon thereafter pardoned by the king. While this is nowhere near the level of ruthlessness one finds in other regional regimes, the message and latent threat to the opposition more generally is nonetheless clear. Having a criminal conviction also bars an individual from running for office in the future, and the regime therefore managed to remove Shubaylat from parliamentary opposition permanently.
Unlike Shubaylat and other critics, the Muslim Brotherhood intended not only to compete in the elections, but also hoped ultimately to gain positions in government and reform state policy. In the 1989 elections, to the surprise of many in the Hashemite regime, the Muslim Brotherhood secured 22 parliamentary seats (out of a total of 80), while independent Islamists won an additional 12 seats. With a bloc of 34 seats in parliament, the Jordanian Islamist movement elected one of its most influential leaders, Dr. Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat, to be speaker of the house. For Arabiyyat, the events of 1989 served as a "wake-up call" for the Hashemite regime.[10] Prime Minister Mudar Badran, responding to the Islamist electoral victories, invited several Islamists into his government. This, however, led to a rift within the movement regarding a very important proposition: Should Islamists serve in the government at all?
Hardline members of the Islamist movement argued that this amounted to a kind of capitulation to the state, and in effect a contamination of the movement itself. Many left the Brotherhood over this issue, becoming part of Jordan’s longstanding traditional of independent Islamist thought and activism. Yet the more mainstream members of the Ikhwan saw serving as cabinet ministers as a well-deserved reward for years of organizational effort. Among this latter group were Abdallah Akaylah (minister of education), Yusuf al-Azm (minister of social development), Majid al-Khalifa (minister of justice), Zayd al-Kilani (minister of awqaf and religious affairs), and Adnan al-Jaljuli (minister of health).[11]
With five cabinet portfolios and leading a bloc of 34 parliamentary seats, the Muslim Brotherhood had accomplished an astounding political victory. This was tempered rather quickly, however, when public opinion turned against many of the measures that the Islamist ministers imposed. The most notorious of these included a failed attempt to ban alcohol in the kingdom, sexual segregation in some governmental office buildings, and a ban (later rescinded) on fathers watching their daughters in competitive sports. It is important to note, here, that this too played into the state’s strategy. While the Hashemite regime had no way of knowing what specific policies would be implemented, regime officials were certain that the Islamist ministers–if given room to maneuver–would in fact rile public opinion against their various measures. The idea, in short, was to ease tensions by including the opposition in government, but also to allow them to fall flat in the face of a backlash in public opinion.[12]
In any event, the government itself was dissolved merely six months later, and replaced with an equally short-lived cabinet led by new Prime Minister Tahir al-Masri, a more liberal and progressive politician. This time, the Brotherhood rejected the few token ministries it was offered and instead worked to oust the Masri government in a no confidence vote. While the vote never carried, Masri’s position had become quickly unworkable, and once again the government was replaced.[13]
The regime clearly remained alarmed at the level of Islamist influence and electoral success, however, and government efforts thereafter turned on limiting Islamist successes in future elections. The regime therefore responded to the Islamist victories with a sweeping change of the electoral system: changing to a one-person one-vote structure with modified electoral districts. While the earlier system, which allowed Jordanians to vote for multiple MP’s (depending on how many would represent the given district) had perhaps exaggerated Islamist strength, the new system was designed to do precisely the reverse. In the 1993 elections, which followed the legalization of political parties in the kingdom, the Muslim Brotherhood did not directly participate, returning instead to its traditional role as political, social, and charitable movement. Instead, many Ikhwan members, and even Islamists outside the Brotherhood, formed and joined the IAF.[14] The IAF over time became, in effect, the political party wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. As such, the IAF participated in the 1993 elections, but secured only 16 parliamentary seats, while independent Islamists dropped to a mere six seats. However, this drop off in representation appeared to be due more to the changed electoral law, rather than to a backlash against Islamist government policies.[15]
Following the drop in electoral strength in the 1993 elections, the Islamist movement demanded a repeal of the newer electoral system. They correctly argued that the districts themselves were unbalanced: over-representing more conservative, pro-regime rural areas, and under-representing more urban–and more Palestinian–areas that had provided key bases of support for Jordanian Islamism. When the government refused to comply with Islamist demands to change the electoral system, the IAF led a broad-based opposition coalition (including leftist and pan-Arab nationalist parties) in an 11-party boycott of the 1997 elections. The resulting parliament naturally proved to be overwhelmingly conservative, nationalist, and pro-Hashemite.[16] With only six independent Islamist MP’s in the new parliament, and no MP’s whatsoever from the IAF, Islamist strength and strategy shifted from parties and parliament, toward the professional associations instead. In short order, Islamist candidates won the leadership posts of almost every professional association in the kingdom (e.g. engineers, pharmacists, medical doctors), thereby creating a basis for Islamist political activism outside the halls of parliament, but very much within Jordanian civil society.[17]
KING ABDALLAH II AND THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT
In 1999, King Hussein of Jordan died after a long battle with cancer. He was succeeded by his eldest son, Abdallah, who became King Abdallah II. While the succession itself had proceeded smoothly and peacefully, the same could not be said for regional politics and hence Jordan’s immediate political environment. With the emergence of the second Palestinian uprising–or intifada–in 2000 and preparations looming for a second U.S. war on Iraq, the new Jordanian regime decided to put off part of the political liberalization process, by postponing parliamentary elections scheduled for November 2001.
Yet in 2003, after two years of postponements, Jordan held its fourth round of parliamentary elections since the start of the liberalization process in 1989. The 2003 elections were the first under King Abdallah II, and marked the return of the opposition to electoral politics. This time the IAF and the opposition parties eschewed the boycott tactics of 1997 and instead contested the elections, which were held under a new set of laws extending the number of parliamentary seats from 80 to 110, including a minimum of six seats to guarantee women’s representation in parliament. Seventeen IAF members gained parliamentary seats. Interestingly, the IAF parliamentary deputies included Hayat al-Musani, the first woman elected to parliament under the quota system. In addition to the IAF bloc, five independent Islamists were also elected to parliament.[18]
While the IAF remained focused on its own Islamist political agenda, most legislation continued to emerge from the government itself, with the parliament serving as a debating forum that usually provided a legislative stamp of approval for government initiatives. The IAF had no success in achieving its broadest policy goals. These unfulfilled goals included implementing Shari’a (Islamic law) and abrogating the Jordan-Israel peace treaty.
Still, the IAF did align itself with more secular conservative forces to block repeated government attempts to change Jordan’s laws regarding "honor crimes;" that is, crimes purportedly linked to family honor in which men kill female relatives who are believed to have in some way shamed the family. Jordan’s monarchy itself has endorsed attempts to change the kingdom’s otherwise lenient pattern of sentencing for these crimes. Yet the Islamist movement, in temporary alliances with other social conservatives in parliament, has consistently opposed attempts to change the legal system regarding "crimes of honor."[19]
Salafists, Jihadists, and "Jordan’s 9-11"
While the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF are the best organized, most recognizable faces of Islamism in Jordan, there also remain more subtle and even underground forms. Jordan’s Salafiyya movement, for example, has grown steadily since the 1980s. The term "Salafi" refers to the earliest Muslim communities and specifically the immediate companions of Muhammad. The Salafiyya movement, in fact, originally emerged from the reformist efforts of Islamic Modernist thinker Jamal al-Din al-Afghani in the nineteenth century. Yet in the late twentieth century the term Salafiyya has changed dramatically and perhaps even reversed the earlier emphasis on modernism and reform. Salafism today, in contrast, usually refers to a more hardline and puritanical approach to Islamic revivalism. Some versions of Salafism (although not all) have turned instead toward militancy, terrorism, and jihadi activism.
In the Jordanian case, as in many other countries, the rise in Salafi activity coincided with the end of the Afghani mujahidin war against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. This is, in short, a much more recent phenomenon than the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood. Many credit the rise of a Salafi alternative (to both the Jordanian state and its more established Islamist opposition) to the arrival in Jordan of the influential Salafi Shaykh Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Bani. Shaykh al-Bani fled to the kingdom from Syria in 1979, as the Ba’thist state was deepening its crackdown on Sunni Islamists in Syria. In the words of Quintan Wiktorowicz, the arrival of al-Bani "precipitated an explosion of Salafi activism" as he essentially served as a "focal point" for Islamists seeking a return to what they viewed as a more authentic and traditional approach to Islam.[20]
Still, while the Salafi alternative has increased in strength in Jordan over time, it also remains of at least two minds. Some Salafists believe that radical change is needed in Jordan, but they do not necessarily believe that jihad is either viable or appropriate. For others, jihad is the only alternative. Not surprisingly these latter Salafists include many returned veterans of the Afghan wars. The jihadi tendency within the Jordanian Salafi movement sees itself as takfiri; that is, those who declare the Hashemite state as kafir–unbelievers against whom jihad is no less than a duty. These Salafi jihadists are influenced not only by Shaykh al-Bani, but also by the earlier writings of thirteenth century Islamist Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya and twentieth century Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb.[21]
Wiktorowicz has argued that while the Muslim Brotherhood and IAF rely on formal organization and participation in political parties, professional associations, and charities, the Salafi movement has instead relied on informal networks for recruitment and activism. He further argues that many of Jordan’s religious scholars, the ulama, are themselves Salafists. The informal networks, meanwhile, allow Salafists to at least attempt to continue their activism under the radar of state surveillance.[22] Still, despite the rise in Salafiyya ideas and activity, most of Jordan’s Islamist movement remains more mainstream, reformist, and democratic, while the major terrorist threats have come largely from foreign al-Qa’ida militants.
The worst terrorist attack in Jordan occurred in November 2005, as noted at the outset of this article, as al-Qa’ida suicide bombers struck three luxury hotels in central Amman, killing 60 people–mostly Jordanians–and injuring more than 100. The IAF and the Muslim Brotherhood were among the first to respond to the tragedy by organizing anti-al-Qa’ida demonstrations in the capital. The demonstrations underscored the difference between moderate mainstream pro-democratic forms of Islamism (such as Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood) and militant global jihadi organizations (such as al-Qa’ida). The terrorists struck on the 9 November 2005–hence, it was literally "Jordan’s 9-11"–and all were ethnic Iraqis sent to Jordan merely days earlier on the orders of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi. Zarqawi, formerly a Jordanian national, had become the self-styled leader of al-Qa’ida in Iraq. The attack, it seems, was meant to punish Jordan for its closeness to the United States, among other grievances against the Hashemites.[23]
Jordanian intelligence services had claimed to have previously foiled no less than 150 other plots to public safety and security from militant Islamists affiliated with al-Qa’ida. Yet all earlier plots had involved Jordanian nationals, while the November 2005 bombings were carried out by Iraqi suicide bombers. These militants, unfortunately, managed to slip through the network of security and intelligence to carry out their attacks. Al-Qa’ida militants had, however, earlier struck on a more limited scale, including firing Katyusha rockets in Jordan’s port city of Aqaba, killing one Jordanian soldier.[24]
The scale and barbarity of the Amman bombings, each of which targeted a wedding party taking place in a major (Western) hotel chain in central Amman, seemed to transform Jordanian public opinion regarding Islamist militancy and terrorism. In a poll conducted by the University of Jordan’s Center for Strategic Studies, responses to the same questions varied greatly between 2004 and December 2005–one month after the attacks. In the 2004 survey, 68 percent of Jordanians polled viewed al-Qa’ida as a "legitimate resistance organization." In 2005, that number had declined to 20 percent. Similarly, in 2004, only 10.6 percent labeled al-Qa’ida as a terrorist organization, while in 2005 that number had increased to 48.9 percent. When the pollsters added a distinction, and asked specifically about the Zarqawi-led organization within al-Qa’ida, 72.2 percent of Jordanians saw it as a terrorist organization rather than a legitimate resistance organization.[25]
Despite the hostility of most Jordanians, including Islamists, to the terrorist attacks, the Islamist movement in parliament nonetheless soon found itself squaring off with the government following a major cabinet reshuffle. The new government made clear that the monarchy had shifted entirely to security-mode. King Abdallah dismissed the more moderate Prime Minister Adnan Badran, and replaced him with Ma’ruf Bakhit, Jordan’s former ambassador to Israel and very much a security hawk. Conservative royalists retained the speakership posts in both the lower house of parliament (under Abd al-Hadi al-Majali) as well as the upper house or senate (under former prime minister Zayd al-Rifa’i). Neither man was known for his sympathies for Islamists, or for Palestinians for that matter.
Aware that security concerns had provided the pretext for a host of earlier deliberalization moves over the years, Islamist members of parliament urged the regime not to use the tragedy of the bombings as an excuse to issue new martial laws. The government, for its part, declared that counterterrorism would be a key policy focus and it called for "preemptive war" specifically on militant forms of Islamism. Although Muslim Brotherhood and IAF were not in any way militant, they nonetheless feared that new security measures might be used against them. In January 2006, seemingly on cue, the government issued charges against one of the IAF’s leaders, Jamil Abu Bakr, for "harming the dignity of the state." The charges stemmed from articles on the IAF website that criticized the government tendency to appoint officials due mainly to connections (wasta) rather than expertise or parliamentary consultations. The charges were dropped the following month, but the sense of harassment remained. The regime meanwhile moved still further in its efforts to rein in more militant Islamism, including issuing a new law restricting preaching in mosques and issuing fatwas only to government-approved ulama. Finally, perhaps the most ominous sign was the new and decidedly elastic anti-terrorism law that seemed to greatly expand the roles, powers, and influence of the intelligence and police services in daily life.[26]
The Hamas Factor in Jordanian Politics?
With the sweeping victory of Hamas in Palestinian legislative elections in January 2006, a "Hamas factor" appeared to have reinvigorated Jordan’s already well-organized and well-established Islamist movement. With its emphasis on anti-corruption in its political campaign, as well as its maintenance of charities, clinics, and schools, Hamas was in many ways adopting the electoral strategies and tactics of Jordan’s IAF and Muslim Brotherhood. Yet unlike Hamas, the IAF and Muslim Brotherhood do not have a militant wing, and instead focus on civilian party and interest group organization and remain very much a part of the pro-democratization movement in the kingdom. Hamas representatives were expelled from Jordan in 1999, when the kingdom severed ties and closed their offices.
Now, however, with the Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections, the IAF called on the Jordanian government to restore ties and recognize their achievement. Jordan’s Islamists were also inspired by the relative success of Muslim Brotherhood candidates (running as independents) in Egyptian parliamentary elections as well as the rise of Islamist activists to power in neighboring Iraq. Jordanian Islamists, like their counterparts elsewhere, campaigned on platforms of clean government and inclusion, and their credibility in this area benefited from their already-established reputation for civic mindedness, based on the extensive Muslim Brotherhood network of charitable organizations.[27]
In the midst of this Islamist euphoria over the inspiring electoral successes of others, however, the IAF and Muslim Brotherhood did nothing to endear themselves to an already suspicious Hashemite regime, when Islamist activists chose to attend the Arab political parties conference held in Damascus in March 2006. Syrian President Bashar al-Asad hosted the conference on behalf of Syria’s Ba’thist regime. Thus Jordanian Islamists attended an event that banned Islamists from Syria itself. The point was not lost on Syria’s exiled Muslim Brotherhood, which lambasted the IAF for its lack of solidarity and questionable judgment.
The IAF meanwhile found itself also attacked by the Jordanian government, when President Asad mockingly referred to the Hashemite regime’s "Jordan First" policy. Asad coupled "Jordan First" with Lebanon’s recently unveiled "Lebanon First" agenda, suggesting that such narrow visions meant that surely the United States or Israel lurked as a close second. While the Jordanian press castigated the Syrian regime for arrogance and a long list of other complaints, the Hashemite regime remained angered that the Jordanians present at the speech had either failed to refute Asad’s comments, or worse, had actually applauded.[28]
For many Islamists, the Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections was inspiring, but it was also a reminder of their comparative limitations. Hamas’ electoral win translated immediately into a new Hamas-led government and cabinet. Within Jordan, in contrast, almost two decades of Islamist electoral strategies had indeed translated to some success, but to no chance whatsoever to form an IAF government in Jordan. After the Hamas victory, however, a new boldness entered the rhetoric of some IAF leaders, who now announced their new political program. Some aspects remain cornerstones of earlier programs: fully implementing Shari’a law, abandoning the Wadi Araba treaty, ending normalization with Israel.[29] Yet others included demands to stop attempting to "downsize" the Islamist movement through electoral laws designed to minimize their representation. Azzam al-Hunaydi, the leader of the IAF bloc within parliament, minced no words when he stated flatly that "that which faces the Islamic movement–in terms of attempts at marginalization and exclusion, tailoring of laws and the policy of ceilings–will not last indefinitely." He may have caught the attention of Jordan’s security-focused regime when he added even more starkly that "the time of downsizing, marginalization, showing scorn for people and being captive to foreigners will end soon."[30]
In the view of Hunaydi and many other Islamist activists, Jordan remained committed to the wrong paths in both domestic and foreign policy. The IAF therefore presented itself as an alternative approach, and one that was ready to govern. The "Hamas effect," in short, had provided the Jordanian Islamist movement with a renewed optimism.[31] IAF deputies charged that in freer and fairer elections, they might win 40 to 50 percent of the vote. With Islamists rising to prominence and power through nearby elections–Hizballah in Lebanon, various Islamist Shi’a parties in Iraq, and Hamas in the Palestinian territories–Jordanian Islamists argued that they might now be poised to win an outright majority in parliament. Given Jordan’s heavily gerrymandered electoral districts, which favor rural over urban districts (and hence under-represent predominantly Palestinian and Islamist areas of the kingdom), the IAF optimism may be unfounded. Even aside from gerrymandered districts, the party has never received close to half the overall votes. Yet under a new and more even-handed electoral law, they would nonetheless be likely to do fairly well. Indeed, IAF and Muslim Brotherhood officials made very clear their overall view of the current system, when they repeatedly called on the regime to issue a new "democratic elections law" (emphasis added).[32]
In addition to concerns about the electoral system, Jordanian Islamists also insisted that governments should then be drawn from parliament in a truer model of a parliamentary system, rather than royally-appointed pending only the formality of parliamentary approval. IAF deputies remained certain that their "street" support greatly exceeded their actual parliamentary power. In the wrangling within Jordanian politics over the next and "final" law on parties and elections, the IAF insisted that hinted bans on religiously-based parties remain off the table, while a more truly democratic election law remains very much an IAF interest, so that the alleged Islamist street majority could one day become a governing coalition.
This issue of linking elections to actual governance was a key sticking point in the struggle between the government and its opposition, when they bargained over the ground rules for the next rounds of parliamentary elections. Yet in effect, the government and its opponents were also debating the future nature of the Jordanian state itself.
Islamists and the 2007 Jordanian Elections
The November 2007 national parliamentary elections followed an earlier round of municipal elections, held throughout the kingdom in July 2007. If that earlier set of elections was viewed as a harbinger of things to come, its conclusion did not encourage the Islamists. Amidst widespread charges of vote-rigging, the IAF announced its withdrawal from the process, but only on election day itself. The government quickly argued that the Islamists were merely attempting to save face in the midst of a resounding electoral defeat, while the Islamist movement, in contrast, insisted that the regime was engaged in an elaborate process of vote-rigging. Both sides may have had a point. At issue was the practice of busing soldiers to polling places, who would then vote in very large numbers, presumably tipping the scales to pro-government candidates even in Islamist strongholds like Irbid and Zarqa. The Islamists therefore felt that they were being systematically under-represented, and that this was part of a broader process to sideline them in Jordanian politics and society. Indeed, the year before, in 2006, the regime had even dissolved the Muslim Brotherhood’s main means of distributing its social welfare programs and funds: the Islamic Center Charity.[33]
It was therefore in an atmosphere of increasing wariness, and even mutual hostility between the state and the Islamist movement, that the national election campaign began. This tense context only exacerbated divisions within the Islamist movement itself, particularly between hawks and doves, regarding tactics and strategy, if not policy. The dovish and moderate wing of the movement, which had for so long maintained a level of understanding with the Hashemite state, even negotiated with the government in an attempt to allay the regime’s fears of the hawks. Indeed, Jordan’s intelligence services seemed to view the hawkish wing, led by IAF Secretary General Zaki Bani-Irshayd, as increasingly a de facto Jordanian Hamas-style movement operating within the broader Islamist framework.[34]
The moderate wing agreed to field a mere 22 candidates (down from the usual 30 or so) in the national elections and even ensured that most of these would be from the dovish wings of the IAF and Muslim Brotherhood. Having secured 17 seats in the previous parliament, the Islamist movement expected to retain its earlier strength at minimum. Yet when the votes were counted, Islamist representation (out of a parliament of 110) had plummeted to only six seats. More surprisingly, no Islamist candidates were elected in key political bases such as Irbid and Zarqa.[35] Once again, the recriminations flowed swiftly.
The IAF and Muslim Brotherhood leaders each accused the government of fraud and vote-rigging. Specifically, they argued that vote-buying schemes were widespread, with the government allegedly ignoring widespread irregularities.[36] The recriminations did not stop there, however, but resurfaced within the Islamist movement itself. Hawks such as Bani-Irshayd, who had been so skeptical of the process in the first place, accused moderates of losing the elections for the Islamist movement. The attempt of the moderates to work with the regime appeared to have back-fired. In his analysis of state survival strategies in Jordan, Asher Susser has argued that the 2007 election outcome was the result, in effect, of the more hawkish Islamist elements greatly overplaying their hand, combined with a pronounced sharp reaction of a state that was in a defensive and even "punitive" mood. "The attempt by the doves in the movement to come to an understanding with the government at the last minute was essentially rebuffed," Susser argues, "The hawks had crossed a line, and the Islamists as a whole were going to be taught a lesson."[37]
For both sides the immediate regional context was critical. Islamist successes in elections in Gaza, the West Bank, Egypt, Lebanon, and even Turkey seemed to prompt the Jordanian IAF to push for far more than the Jordanian Islamist movement had heretofore achieved, or been allowed to achieve. While the Hashemite regime, in contrast, felt hard-pressed to contain what they viewed as a Hamas-like shift within Jordanian Islamism. Jordanian analyst Hasan Barari, while acknowledging the probability of state electioneering, has also argued that the major factor may have been a shift in Jordanian public opinion itself, especially in the wake of the 2005 Amman bombings.[38] Despite the moderation and reformism of most of Jordan’s Islamist movement, there may have been some level of public backlash and impatience with Islamists in general.
The main victims of the elections, however, may have been–not simply Islamists–but moderate Islamists. The government’s strategy appeared to be shifting beyond containment of Islamism in the kingdom, and towards a more active and even aggressive strategy of disrupting the movement, and deepening intra-Islamist divisions. The question, of course, is whether this electoral disaster for the Islamist movement leads it, ultimately, to itself pursue its traditional loyal opposition strategy, or shift to a more radical and more confrontational approach to the Hashemite state.
CONCLUSIONS
For more than 60 years, the Hashemite monarchy and its mainstream Islamist movement have maintained a cooperative relationship. In recent years, however, a pattern of deliberalization threatened to erode that long pattern of Islamist loyal opposition to the monarchy and the state. The monarchy saw these measures as necessary, given the extreme and even violent circumstances in the region. Jordan remained wedged between violence in neighboring states: that is, between a Palestinian uprising and Israeli military responses, to the west, while to the east, Iraq was mired in war, occupation, insurgency, and civil strife.
After the 2005 al-Qa’ida bombings in the capital itself, the regime’s already-established security emphases simply became that much stronger. Yet the danger remained that the regime’s security concerns were effectively undermining Jordan’s once-heralded process of political liberalization and democratization. The regime’s tolerance for Islamist dissent, for example, was limited indeed. When several IAF members of parliament paid a condolence call to the family of the late Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi (killed in Iraq in 2006), they were soon arrested and tried with crimes against the state. The arrested MP’s included Ali Abu Sukkar, Ja’far Hurani, and Muhammad Abu Faris. Abu Faris angered the regime still further (and indeed infuriated Jordanian public opinion as well) when, in an interview with the satellite television station al-Arabiyya, he stated that Zarqawi was a martyr, but that the victims of the Amman bombings were not.[39] The three deputies were convicted of inciting terrorism, but in a very familiar pattern of reining in dissent in Hashemite Jordan, they were later pardoned and released.
Many Islamists read this episode as merely a small part of an overall campaign against them. Moreover, while Abu Faris is indeed more radical than most Islamists active in Jordanian public life, the regime’s general pattern of actions seemed to be directed not simply toward individuals, but rather against the IAF and the Muslim Brotherhood more broadly. While the regime would reject this interpretation, many in Jordan’s mainstream Islamist movement would not. The Islamist movement itself, in the meantime, remained divided and indeed strained by the fallout and recriminations from the disastrous 2007 parliamentary elections.
Even as the hawks attempted to sideline moderates, calling for their resignations and blaming them for the loss, the moderate leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood managed to respond firmly. In April 2008, the internal party court within the Brotherhood officially suspended radicals Zaki Bani-Irshayd and Muhammad Abu Faris for one year from membership in the powerful Shura council that runs the organization. [40] Yet Bani-Irshayd retained his position as secretary general of the IAF, while the hardline Hammam al-Sa’id was elected to be the new general guide of the Muslim Brotherhood. Just as importantly, however, the moderates reaffirmed their position by securing half of the seats on the Brotherhood’s ruling Shura council and by electing moderate leader Abd al-Latif al-Arabiyyat as head of the council itself. The Shura council, therefore, continues to reflect the divisions within the Islamist movement itself The IAF, for its part, had to scramble to make the deadline to comply with a new political parties law in the kingdom. While Jordanian Islamists objected to the newer and more restrictive approach to political parties, the IAF did manage in April 2008 to renew its license and hence retain its legal status in Jordan. As the discussion above makes clear, however, the debates over tactics, strategy, and the role of Islamism in Jordanian politics nonetheless continued, both within the Islamist movement and within the Hashemite regime itself.
Jordanian government officials often argue that any restrictive measures are actually quite moderate (when compared to most other states in the Middle East) and that they are simply prudent given the extreme circumstances in the region.[41] In contrast, many in the Islamist movement feel that the longstanding cooperation between reformist Islamism and the monarchy may be in decline. These vastly different interpretations are a key issue for the future of Jordanian politics, as they will in turn affect the policies and tactics of both government and opposition in Jordan. There is, in short, a danger here that the regime’s various deliberalization moves in recent years (all made in the name of national security) may ultimately serve to alienate the moderates who make up the overwhelming majority of Jordan’s Islamist activists, unwittingly empowering the heretofore smaller but more militant alternatives.
*Curtis R. Ryan is an associate professor of political science at Appalachian State University, North Carolina. He holds a B.A. from Drew University and an M.A. and a Ph.D. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He served as a Fulbright Scholar at the Center for Strategic Studies in Jordan (1992-1993) and was twice named a Peace Scholar by the United States Institute of Peace. He is the author of Jordan in Transition: From Hussein to Abdullah (Lynne Rienner, 2002) as well as articles published in the Middle East Journal, Middle East Insight, Arab Studies Quarterly, Israel Affairs, Southeastern Political Review, Journal of Third World Studies, Middle East Policy, and Middle East Report. His new book is on Inter-Arab Alliances (forthcoming in 2008, University Press of Florida).
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